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ABSTRACT 
 
The performance of the agriculture sector over the last four decades remained 
quite satisfactory with an average growth rate of 3.4 percent per annum higher than the 
population growth rate in the country. Still the country is far behind in its efforts to 
provide an acceptable level of dietary requirement to its people even at the aggregate 
level. The daily average availability of calories per person in the country is significantly 
lower than the other developing and developed nations. Though share of wheat is 
declining overtime, it is still the dominant source of total calories intake and thus plays a 
vital role in food security in the country. 
Regardless of the reasonable rate of growth in agriculture sector, caloric based 
poverty increased during the 1990s may be due to the worsening income and 
landholdings inequality. Further to note is the fact that despite significant improvement in 
food supply in the aggregate, malnutrition is a widespread phenomenon in Pakistan. 
The government of Pakistan had been pursuing interventionist policies quite 
actively in agricultural inputs as well as outputs markets to ensure food security. Though 
most of these interventions have now been abolished, but some still remains. Particularly, 
wheat marketing mainly is being handled by the public sector. The comparison of the 
incidentals of government-owned departments with that of the private traders clearly 
shows inefficiency of the former. In addition to cost difference, the corruption is 
pervasive in commodity marketing particularly in public sector. 
Eliminating the government interventions the results of the CGE model lead us to 
draw four major conclusions: 1) price of wheat would turn out to be too high to be 
 ii
affordable to the consumers; 2) Production may not increase much to compensate to 
bring the consumer prices down; 3) The loss in consumer surplus will be more than the 
producer gain; and 4) All household groups will face lower welfare except the urban non-
poor: The latter may look for cheaper food substitutes. The reader is however cautioned 
for careful implications of these results obtained from static CGE model. The dynamic 
long-run effects have not been captured in this model. 
Though the existing system of procurement and distribution creates disincentives 
for the private sector to invest in wheat trade, it however may not be advisable to leave 
the wheat economy fully at the behest of the markets owing to the importance of wheat in 
household consumption and production. It is suggested that the government should 
slowly step out of the food market and let the market function freely. However, the 
system of effective monitoring and maintaining an optimal size of buffer stock for wheat 
can avoid extreme food price fluctuations and shortages in the country. The stock 
purchase and release by the government should be based on market prices. 
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IMPACT OF DOMESTIC POLICIES TOWARDS AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION AND MARKET REFORM ON FOOD SECURITY IN 
PAKISTAN 
 
Munir Ahmad1, Caesar Cororaton2, Abdul Qayyum3,  and Muhammad Iqbal4 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Agriculture is the largest income and employment-generating sector of Pakistan’s 
economy. Its’ contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) exceeds 23 percent and to 
employment 42 percent. Exports of raw and processed agricultural products make the major 
source of national foreign exchange earnings. The sector provides raw materials to domestic 
industrial sector and acts as an important source of demand for manufactured products. 
Because of its extensive inter-linkages with rest of the economy, it is widely believed that 
country’s agriculture must maintain a high growth rate in order to ensure a rapid growth of 
national income, attaining macroeconomic stability, effective employment of growing labor 
force, improving distributive justice, enhancing food security, and a reduction in rural 
poverty in Pakistan (Naqvi et. al., 1992 and 1994) and (Mellor, 1988). 
The performance of the agricultural sector from 1960 to 2004 was quite 
satisfactory with an average growth rate of 3.4% per annum. However, there were wide 
year-to-year fluctuations in growth rates during this period. Within the agricultural sector, 
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the livestock sub-sector grew relatively faster with an annual growth rate of 3.5%. The 
growth in cereal production was nearly 3.5%. Cereals constitute roughly 97% of the total 
food grains output including all pulses. Within cereals, wheat is the major food grain 
contributing about 74% to total production of cereals. 
Among the food grains, wheat and rice both grew at faster rates at 3.7% per 
annum while the growth rates of maize, other cereals, gram and other pulses were 3.4, 
0.13, 0.05, and 0.3% respectively (Table 1). Dominant source in growth of wheat, rice 
and maize has been the higher productivity per unit of land, while in other food grains, 
the productivity either has declined or the increase is only marginal. The reasons for this 
trend are the absence of technological breakthroughs in seeds and production 
technologies for these crops, and changes in consumption pattern towards superior 
cereals. The other reason is that the public sector R&D efforts remained focused on major 
crops including wheat, cotton and rice, while the other crops got very little attention. 
However, the government of Pakistan has a history of intervening in agricultural 
markets resulting into under pricing of commodities relative to world levels (Chaudhry, 
2001; Dorosh and Valdes, 1990; Nabi, Hamid and Naseem, 1990). Though most of the 
government interventions have been removed and the markets operate freely, except 
wheat.5 The wheat market in the country is characterized by significant government 
interventions in pricing, procurement, stocking, distribution and transportation. These 
                                                 
5 The details are given latter sections of the study.   
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interventions involves heavy subsidy every year ranging from Rs.2.8 billion in 1990/91 to 
Rs.12.4 billion in 2002/03 (Faruqee, 2005). 
Various empirical studies relating to effect of government interventions in wheat 
marketing in Pakistan are found in literature including Dorosh and Valdes (1990), Hamid 
et al (1990), Barkley (1992), Ashfaq, Griffith and Parton (2001), and Abedullah and Ali 
(2001). All of these studies relied on partial measures of analysis, which do not capture 
the policy effects on all sectors of the economy. The policy interventions often have 
economy wide effects that can be analyzed using the general equilibrium framework. No 
systematic work is found to date evaluating the economy wide effects of government 
interventions in agriculture. This paper bridges this gap providing the detailed review of 
government policies in agriculture sector in general and wheat in particular, and uses the 
Computable General Equilibrium framework to analyze the economy wide effects of 
domestic trade liberalization as well as on food security. 
The paper is divided into eight sections. Section two discusses the factors relevant 
for food security. . The government interventions in agriculture sector are reviewed in 
section three. Procurement and distribution of food grains are discussed in section four.  
The fifth section analyzes efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the existing system of 
procurement and distribution. Section six presents the framework and the results of the 
CGE model. Section seven discusses the policy options and section 8 concludes. 
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Table 1—Growth rates of area, production, and yield for various food grains 
Year Wheat Rice Maize Other 
Cereals 
All 
Cereals 
Gram Other 
Pulses 
Area Growth Rates (%) 
1959/60 to 1969/70 2.75 3.37 3.34 -1.60 2.19 -1.87 -3.28 
1969/70 to 1979/80 1.18 2.55 0.88 -1.23 1.11 2.16 0.29 
1979/80 to 1989/90 1.40 0.39 2.34 -0.35 1.10 -0.83 0.99 
1989/90 to 1999/00 0.85 1.99 1.21 -3.63 0.73 -0.70 -0.34 
1999/00 to 2000/01 -3.34 -5.53 -1.87 8.19 -2.94 -6.89 -5.15 
2000/01 to 2001/02 -1.50 -11.03 -0.21 3.14 -2.91 3.20 5.19 
2001/02 to 2002/03 -0.30 5.25 -0.64 -9.93 -0.06 3.10 3.36 
2002/03 to 2003/04 2.27 10.61 1.28 29.94 5.57 1.97 2.82 
1959/60 to 2003/04 1.17 1.60 1.52 -0.78 1.01 -0.34 -0.35 
Yield Growth Rates (%) 
1959/60 to 1969/70 4.31 6.69 1.38 3.48 4.86 0.24 1.86 
1969/70 to 1979/80 3.30 0.74 2.15 0.49 2.75 -4.89 -0.33 
1979/80 to 1989/90 1.70 -0.38 1.01 -0.50 1.29 9.53 -0.51 
1989/90 to 1999/00 3.52 3.32 2.57 1.63 3.61 0.75 1.93 
1999/00 to 2000/01 -6.66 -1.41 1.34 -3.38 -5.65 -24.44 -0.56 
2000/01 to 2001/02 -2.71 -9.15 1.49 1.00 -3.66 -11.62 -1.70 
2001/02 to 2002/03 5.57 9.64 5.10 -0.33 6.56 80.67 6.35 
2002/03 to 2003/04 -0.60 -2.12 7.83 -1.25 -1.67 -11.23 -0.99 
1959/60 to 2003/04 2.50 1.99 1.80 0.93 2.44 0.39 0.66 
Production Growth Rates (%) 
1959/60 to 1969/70 7.18 10.28 4.77 1.83 7.17 -1.67 -1.48 
1969/70 to 1979/80 4.52 3.30 3.04 -0.76 3.90 -3.81 -0.03 
1979/80 to 1989/90 3.12 0.01 3.37 -0.86 2.41 7.95 0.47 
1989/90 to 1999/00 4.39 5.37 3.82 -2.06 4.37 0.06 1.58 
1999/00 to 2000/01 -1.14 -6.87 -0.54 4.45 -8.44 -29.73 -5.68 
2000/01 to 2001/02 -0.47 -19.18 1.28 4.26 -6.45 -8.82 3.40 
2001/02 to 2002/03 0.57 15.41 4.39 -10.22 6.50 86.46 9.92 
2002/03 to 2003/04 1.65 8.26 9.21 28.31 3.81 -9.48 1.80 
1959/60 to 2003/04 3.72 3.66 3.38 0.13 3.50 0.05 0.30 
Source: Pakistan (2004 and previous issues). 
Note:  Figures in this Table are computed from Annexure Table 1. 
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2.  FACTORS IN FOOD SECURITY  
The concept of food security surfaced during the mid-1970s resulting from the 
world food crises (FAO, 2003). According to FAO, food security exists when all people, 
at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. 
This definition encompasses four dimensions: availability, stability, access, and 
nutritional status. Keeping in view these dimensions we assess the food security situation 
in Pakistan. 
2.1.  AVAILABILITY OF FOOD GRAINS 
Agricultural production is the foundation of food availability, especially for 
calorie and protein. Pakistan has made significant progress in terms of production 
particularly in major cereals. Per capita availability of cereals increased from 118 
kilograms in 1961 to 154 kilograms in 2002, more than 80% of which is accounted for by 
wheat alone (Table 2).6 Being the staple food, wheat accounts for over 37% of the 
cultivated area. Its performance affects the economic growth, import bill, and the 
nutritional status of the people of Pakistan. Hence, it occupies a pivotal position in 
national food security goals. 
                                                 
6 The data is obtained from FAOSTATS food balanced spreadsheets. The latest update includes 
information till 2002.    
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Table 2—Production and per capita availability of cereals in Pakistan 
 Year Production 
 
Change in 
Stock 
 
M-X 
(imports-
exports) 
Total 
Availability 
 
Consumption  Per Capita 
Availability 
Kg/Year 
Cereals (’000 tonnes) 
1961 6167 -308 912 6771 5996 120.2 
1970 10999 336 -113 11223 9994 161.6 
1980 15514 -1108 -541 13855 11729 145.2 
1990 19328 -1279 1305 19356 18504 151.8 
1995 23055 -2143 859 21771 18957 151.8 
2000 28062 -2204 -1023 24835 21570 151.2 
2001 25109 3277 -3080 25296 22287 152.4 
2002 24936 3818 -2678 26076 23099 154.1 
Wheat (’000 tonnes) 
1961 3814 -308 1080 4586 4204 84.2 
1970 7294 336 121 7751 7137 108.6 
1980 10856 -1217 601 10240 9104 112.7 
1990 14316 -691 2045 15670 14223 128.2 
1995 17002 -2243 2702 17462 15759 125.9 
2000 21079 -1995 997 20071 17959 125.9 
2001 19024 1982 -686 20320 18415 125.9 
2002 18227 3469 -1023 20684 18859 125.8 
Source: FAOSTATS (August 2004).  
 
The government of Pakistan has been trying to maintain the 2,400 calories per 
person per day availability since early 1990s from a level of 1,754 calories per person per 
day in 1961 (Table 3). However, daily average availability of calories per person in the 
country is lower by 10 and 26% relative to the averages in other developing and 
developed counties respectively.7 . The change in diet composition overtime shows a 
shrinking share of wheat in total calories consumed and a rising share of calories from 
animals and other sources (Table 3). The share of wheat declined from 48% in 1990 to 
41% in 2002  while the share of other cereals declined from 20% in 1970 to 11% in 1990 
                                                 
7 Average per person per day calorie availability was 2700 in Asia, 2663 in developing, and 3246 in 
developed countries, while the world average was 2792 in 2002 (FAOSTATS (August 2004).  
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and has remained at that level since. The share of livestock products in calorie intake 
increased from 12% in 1970 to 18% in 2002. The share of other items (vegetable oils, 
vegetables, fruits and sweeteners) has been nearly constant after 1980.  
Table 3—Per capita availability of calories and shares of various sources 
Year Total Wheat Other Grains Pulses Animal Others 
 Calories % Calories % Calories % Calories % Calories % Calories % 
1961 1754 100 742 42 342 19 114 6 260 15 296 17 
1970 2203 100 984 45 438 20 77 3 257 12 447 20 
1980 2124 100 967 46 304 14 49 2 261 12 543 26 
1990 2410 100 1153 48 274 11 58 2 309 13 616 26 
1995 2345 100 1048 45 212 9 59 3 353 15 673 29 
2000 2447 100 1000 41 244 10 68 3 436 18 699 29 
2001 2426 100 1000 41 256 11 58 2 436 18 676 28 
2002 2419 100 999 41 275 11 59 2 437 18 649 27 
Source: FAOSTATS (August 2004). 
 
Domestic production, commercial imports and food aid are the main constituents 
of availability at the national level. . The growth in agricultural production in Pakistan 
came mainly from the introduction of green revolution technologies in mid 60’s, i.e. 
fertilizer responsive high yielding wheat and rice varieties. The production of cereals and 
pulses has increased more than three and half times since the early 1960’s. Still, Pakistan 
has been importing significant quantity of wheat and pulses to meet the needs of the fast 
growing population. The share of imports in wheat consumption during 1961-2003 varied 
from 26% in 1961 to 1% in 2003 (Table 4). The large wheat deficit during early 1960s 
was reduced to a great extent during the 1970s by the green revolution. However, later, 
an increased dependency on wheat import was observed with an exception of a few years. 
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In case of rice, however, Pakistan has been quite successful in not only producing enough 
for domestic consumption but in generating an exportable surplus (Table 5). 
Table 4—Food balance-sheet for wheat (quantity in ‘000’ tonnes) 
Year Production Imports Stock change Exports Total Feed, seed 
and others 
Availability Import 
share 
1961 3814 1080 -308 0 4586 385 4201 25.71 
1970 7294 229 336 108 7751 614 7137 3.21 
1975 7673 1345 -482 4 8532 629 7903 17.02 
1980 10856 604 -1217 3 10240 1136 9104 6.63 
1985 11703 982 -589 51 12045 1174 10871 9.03 
1990 14316 2047 -691 2 15670 1447 14223 14.39 
1991 14565 972 -983 2 14552 1456 13096 7.42 
1992 15684 2018 -1443 3 16256 1552 14704 13.72 
1993 16156 2890 -1965 4 17077 1616 15461 18.69 
1994 15213 1902 826 8 17933 1524 16409 11.59 
1995 17002 2706 -2243 4 17461 1702 15759 17.17 
1996 16907 1968 -411 8 18456 1763 16693 11.79 
1997 16650 2500 215 5 19360 1667 17693 14.13 
1998 18694 2534 -1841 9 19378 1883 17495 14.48 
1999 17856 3240 -1507 9 19580 1788 17792 18.21 
2000 21079 1048 -1995 61 20071 2112 17959 5.84 
2001 19024 149 1982 835 20320 1905 18415 0.81 
2002 18227 267 3469 1280 20683 1824 18859 1.42 
2003 19183 94 590 43 19824 1918 17906 0.52 
2004 19335 108 -213 553 18677 1934 16743 0.65 
Source: FAOSTAT (August 2004) and Pakistan (2004). 
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Table 5—Food balance-sheet for rice (quantity in ‘000’ tonnes) 
Year Productio
n 
Import
s 
Stock 
change 
Exports Total Feed, seed 
and others 
Availabili
ty 
Exports 
Share 
1961 1127 2 0 173 956 110 846 0.15 
1970 2200 0 0 229 1971 159 1812 0.1 
1975 2619 0 0 476 2143 295 1848 0.18 
1980 3125 0 0 1082 2043 238 1805 0.35 
1985 2920 0 -67 715 2138 336 1802 0.24 
1990 3262 0 -588 741 1933 362 1571 0.23 
1991 3245 0 45 1199 2091 353 1738 0.37 
1992 3118 0 164 1505 1777 358 1419 0.48 
1993 3997 1 -806 1028 2164 417 1747 0.26 
1994 3448 12 100 980 2580 380 2200 0.28 
1995 3968 0 100 1844 2224 422 1802 0.46 
1996 4307 2 -498 1593 2218 451 1767 0.37 
1997 4335 0 -199 1759 2377 459 1918 0.41 
1998 4676 1 -100 1964 2613 486 2127 0.42 
1999 5158 2 -747 1784 2629 512 2117 0.35 
2000 4805 1 -209 2010 2587 469 2118 0.42 
2001 3884 14 1294 2415 2777 416 2361 0.62 
2002 4481 14 348 1680 3163 456 2707 0.37 
2003 4848 0 0 1768 3080 485 2595 0.36 
2004 4848 0 0 1823 3025 485 2540 0.38 
Source: FAOSTAT (August 2004) and Pakistan (2003). 
2.2.  STABILITY IN SUPPLY OF FOOD GRAINS 
Stability relates to a steady supply of food at the national level and is thus directly 
affected by the performance of the agriculture sector. Apart from production, it also 
entails better management of domestic production, local markets integration and rational 
use of buffer stocks and trade (FAO, 2002). Pakistan has faced severe floods and 
droughts during the last three decades.8 Consequently, fluctuations/shortages in food 
grains production have been common. At times, the government imported even up to one 
fifth of the wheat requirement to meet the shortages. In order to meet the shortages in 
                                                 
8 Floods occurred during 1973 and 1992 while drought occurred in 1998, 2000 and 2001.  
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deficit/urban areas and save consumers from high food prices, the government has been 
actively pursuing the policies of support/procurement prices, storage and distribution 
though at a very high cost.  
2.3. ACCESS TO FOOD 
One of the important indicators of economic access to food is the proportion of 
people below the poverty line (FAO, 1998). The poverty increased during the 1960s 
despite rapid economic growth while it declined during 1970 through 1987-88 in spite the 
growth being relatively slower (Table 6). Pakistan economy continued to grow at slower 
pace with the exception of few years during the 1990s and the declining poverty trends 
got reversed. However, the daily average availability of calories per person progressively 
increased over the last four and half decades. Thus, enhanced food availability at the 
national level does not necessarily translate into actual increased consumption at regional 
or household level. Thus, determinants other than the national income growth have been 
instrumental in pushing people below the poverty line. This could be due to worsening 
income and landholdings inequality in the country (see Table 6 and Annexure Table 2). A 
rising calorie-based poverty implies that most people had declining access to food. In 
addition, disparities in access to education and health may also be crucial. 
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 Table 6—Poverty, GDP growth and inequality  
Head Count Food Poverty Planning Commission Years 
Overall Rural Urban Overall Rural Urban Overall Rural Urban 
GDP 
Growth% Calories 
Gini 
Coefficient 
1963-64 40.25 38.94 44.53 -- -- -- -- -- -- 6.5 1987 0.386 
1966-67 44.50 45.62 40.96 -- -- -- -- -- -- 3.1 2010 0.355 
1968-69 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6.5 2270 0.336 
1969-70 46.53 49.11 38.76 -- -- -- -- -- -- 9.8 2203 0.336 
1970-71 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.2 2199 0.330 
1971-72 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.3 2262 0.345 
1978-79 30.68 32.51 25.94 -- -- -- -- -- -- 5.5 2262 0.373 
1984-85 24.47 25.87 21.17 -- -- -- -- -- -- 8.7 2178 0.369 
1985-86 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6.4 2170 0.355 
1986-87 -- -- -- 26.9 29.4 24.5 -- -- -- 0 2315 0.346 
1987-88 17.32 18.32 14.99 26.4 29.9 22.7 -- -- -- 6.4 2175 0.348 
1990-91 22.11 23.59 18.64 23.3 26.2 18.2 -- -- -- 5.6 2231 0.407 
1992-93 22.32 26.24 21.70 20.3 22.5 16.8 -- -- -- 2.3 2356 0.410 
1993-94 23.60 26.30 19.40 20.8 24.4 15.2 -- -- -- 4.5 2409 0.400 
1996-97 31.00 32.00 27.00 23.6 26.3 19.4 -- -- -- 1.9 2466 0.373 
1998-99 32.60 34.80 25.90 32.6 34.8 25.9 30.6 34.7 20.9 4.2 2456 0.410 
2000-01 -- -- -- -- -- -- 32.1 39.0 22.7 1.8 2426 0.454 
 Source: Amjad and Kemal (1997); Jafri (1998); Jamal and Ghouse (1999); Qureshi and Arif (1999); Pakistan (2004); Kemal (2005)  
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2.4. NUTRITIONAL DIMENSION 
Effective biological absorption of food in the body is also important for food 
security as it ensures nutritional security in face of availability. Biological food 
absorption is affected by the factors like sanitation, clean drinking water9, quality of 
food10 and knowledge of the households regarding proper food storage, processing and 
basic nutrition.  
According to planning commission of Pakistan, per capita food intake in the 
country is higher than the recommended average at the national level (Khan, 2003). 
Nonetheless, the same study indicates that one third of all pregnant women were 
malnourished and over 25% babies had low birth weight in 2001-2. Malnutrition was also 
a major problem, responsible for more than 30% of all infant and child deaths in the 
country in 2001-02. The prevalence of moderate to severe underweight, stunting, and 
wasting among children of less than 5 years of age were  about 38, 37 and 13% 
respectively in 2001-02 (Planning Commission and UNICEF, 2004). Similarly, 
malnourishment among mothers on the basis of body mass index was 21% in 2001-02 
(Khan, 2003). In spite of a decline in population growth rate from 3.06% in 1981 to 1.9% 
in 2004, it continues to be high. Consequently, Pakistan has to pursue supplementary 
population policy in order to reduce poverty, raise quality of life and ensure food 
security. To summarize, there has been enough food available at the national level in 
                                                 
9In Hyderabad, contaminated water took 10 lives and 1000 people were hospitalized during 2 months in 
2004. 
10Khan et al (2002) reported that 51% of the vegetable produce was unsuitable for human consumption due 
to excess chemical residues.  
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Pakistan at least during the last one and half decades. However, access to quality food 
appears to be lacking due to rising income and assets holding inequality leading to 
increase in poverty. 
3. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN AGRICULTURE: AN 
OVERVIEW  
Agricultural prices are the major determinants of producers’ incentives as well as 
real income in developing countries. The governments in developing countries often 
adopt agricultural policies to supply food to urban consumers at low prices at the cost of 
farming communities. In contrast, in developed countries, the farming communities are 
supported at the cost of taxpayers. Like other developing countries, Pakistan has pursued 
interventionist policies in outputs markets as well as agricultural input markets since its 
inception in 1947. 
3.1 OUTPUT MARKETS AND TRADE 
After independence, the country was confronted with problems like settlement, 
shortage of food in deficit areas, revenue constraints, and the balance of payment 
problems (Hamid et al., 1990). The government had no option but resort to interventionist 
policies in trade and domestic markets. It pursued import substitution in manufacturing 
by imposing duties and control on imports of manufactures, and levied export taxes on 
raw cotton and jute to supply cheap raw material to the local industry. This policy 
resulted in high domestic prices of manufactures far above the world level. The import 
substitution policy resulted in the overvalued exchange rate that acted as an indirect tax 
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on agriculture (Hamid et al., 1990). The prices for most agricultural commodities were 
kept considerably lower than the world prices, and the commodities were put through 
compulsory procurement by the government agencies. To ensure procurement, the 
movement of agricultural goods from one district to another was banned in most cases 
except in cotton (Turvey and Cook, 1976; and Chaudhry, 2001). As a result of all this, the 
agriculture sector performed poorly resulting in food crises in the country during the 
1950s. 
To overcome the crises, a formal support price system was initiated in 1960s by 
fixing the price of wheat. Later on rice, cotton, sugarcane, maize, potato, onion, gram, 
and oilseed crops were also included. The objective was to shield the farmers against 
undue fall in prices during the post-harvest period. The policy of compulsory 
procurement was replaced with a voluntary one, and the prices were raised above the 
world level. However, exports and movement of commodities remained banned 
(Chaudhry, 1995). 
The favorable commodity price policy trend got reversed in 1970s. Pakistan 
devalued rupee against US$ by about 131% in 1972 to correct the terms of trade against 
agriculture.11 Since most agricultural inputs were being imported, the prices of inputs 
increased significantly. Also, various institutional and structural reforms were introduced 
by establishing state-owned enterprises and nationalizing the existing ones to enhance 
                                                 
11 Pakistan’s rupee was linked to the US dollar for a long time and it was fixed by the government at a rate 
of Rs 4.76/US$. In May 1972, the rupee was devalued by 131 per cent from Rs 4.76/US$ to Rs 10.59/US$. 
Since the US dollar was devalued against all other currencies, the government of Pakistan also fixed the 
new rate at Rs 9.97/US$ in March 1973. Pakistan maintained a constant nominal exchange rate throughout 
the 1970s (Khan 2003a). 
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government control in marketing and distribution. To effectively pursue its support price 
agenda, the government established many state-owned enterprises such as: 
• 1973- Cotton Export Corporation (CEC)- monopoly in cotton trade; 
• 1973- Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Supplies Corporations (PASSCO) and 
 the provincial Food Departments-undertake price stabilization mainly for wheat; 
• 1974-Rice Export Corporation (REC)-procurement and monopoly in rice export; 
• 1974- Ghee (Edible oil) Corporation of Pakistan (GCP)-development and 
 procurement of non-traditional oilseeds, sunflower, safflower and soybean; 
• 1979- Seed Division, a subsidiary, of GCP-procurement operations; 
• 1980- Agricultural Marketing and Storage Limited (AM&SL)-onion and potato 
 procurement and export; 
• Sugar mills- support price of sugarcane, monopoly procurement within their 
 respective zones. 
The policy of nationalization and excessive control on the marketing and trade of 
agricultural commodities as well as inputs adversely affected the country’s 
macroeconomic situation. To stabilize the economy, the government started structural 
adjustment program in 1979-80 supported by the IMF and the World Bank. The objective 
of the program was to eliminate price and trade distortions by gradually moving away 
from the interventionist policies. As part of reforms, the process of liberalization started 
with shifting from fixed exchange rate to flexible rates that resulted into devaluation of 
more than 30% in early 1980s and it reached up to 100% in 1991 that lead to the 
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difference between open market and official exchange rates to only about 4% (Annexure 
Table 3).12 
However, interventions in commodity markets continued during the 1980s but 
with a new system of fixing the prices recommended by the Agricultural Prices 
Commission (APCOM) set up in 1981. The bases of price recommendations were the 
cost of production. Nonetheless, the system of sugar rationing, zoning of sugar mills, and 
compulsory rice procurement were discontinued. The private sector was permitted to play 
a limited role in rice trading in 1985-86 and the government reduced the intervention of 
REC. However, the implementation of support price for paddy was given to PASSCO 
though its role remained negligible. 
The process of trade liberalization continued during the 1990s. The role of REC 
and CEC gradually declined and both were merged into Trading Corporation of Pakistan 
(TCP). The AM&SL, which was involved in onion and potato business, was closed down 
in 1993 because of its ineffectiveness and financial losses and its role was transferred to 
PASSCO. The private sector was allowed to participate in export of agricultural 
commodities like rice, raw cotton, fruits and vegetables. Some incentives were also given 
to the private sector like duty drawback; 25% freight subsidy on fruits, vegetables, and 
fresh fish and export financing. The government has also encouraged export of wheat and 
its milling products both by private and public sector, and announced subsidy at the rate 
                                                 
12Pakistan followed a managed floating exchange rate system and the State Bank of Pakistan used to fix the 
daily rate. This system was abolished in 1998 and the banks and authorized dealers were allowed to fix 
their own buying/selling rates based on supply and demand in the market (Khan, 2003a). 
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of Rs.3250/tonne amounting to about US$1 million in 2001.  Later it was reduced to 
Rs2500 per tonne in 2002-03. 
Despite efforts to liberalize agriculture, interventions in fixing agricultural prices 
and involvement of state trading still continue. Several parastatals are still operative. The 
government continues to fix support prices and procure certain commodities and 
continues to promote organizations such as provincial Food Departments (PFDs), 
PASSCO and Trading Corporation of Pakistan (TCP). The PFDs and PASSCO are 
exclusively involved in wheat trading, while TCP is involved in procurement of cotton 
and cotton export.  However, subsidy on cotton is not a regular feature. Private traders are 
free to buy the commodity and export but abiding by the rules and regulations set by the 
government of Pakistan.  
As part of structural adjustment program, the reduction in border protections was 
also initiated during the mid eighties. The maximum applied tariff rates reduced from 
225% in 1987-88 to 70% in 1995 and in the recent years to 25% (see Table 7). Though 
there are no domestic market distortions but high border protection continues in edible oil 
industries. 
All non-tariff barriers have been dismantled completely. Import surcharges and 
license fees were removed during 1993 to 1995 (FAO, 2000). All items are freely 
importable including textile products except for 30 items on negative list mostly on 
religious, environmental, security and health grounds. 
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Table 7—Bound and applied tariff rates 
Products Bound Rate 1995 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2005 
Cereals 100-150 0-65 0-25 0-15 0-25 0-25 
      Wheat 150 0 0 0 25 0 
      Wheat Flour 150 10 10 10 10 10 
       Rice 100 25 25 15 5-10 5-10 
Oilseeds 100 10-70 0-45 0-15 0-10 0-10 
Vegetable Oils1 100 25-70 15-45 15-35 10-25 5-25 
Live Animals 100 15-65 10-45 10-35 5-25 5-25 
Meat 100 35-70 15-45 10-35 10-25 5-25 
Dairy 100 25-70 25-45 25-35 25 5-25 
Sugar 100 35-70 25-45 15-35 10-25 5-25 
Coffee and Tea2 100-150 15-70 15-45 25-35 20-25 5-25 
Fruits and Vegetables  100 35-65 35-65 -- 10-25 5-25 
Source: FAO (2000); CBR (various issues);   
Note: 1 There are also specific rates for some oils e.g., Soybeans oil (crude and refined) Rs.9050/tonn, Palm  
             oil from 10200 to 16850/tonn; 2 Bound rates for coffee 100% and tea 150%, applied rates for tea  
             are also high. 
 
3.2. INPUTS MARKETS 
The government also has a history of intervening in agricultural input markets. In 
the early 1960s, the government introduced subsidies for most agricultural inputs to 
promote and intensify their uses. The subsidies are of two types: budgeted and implicit. 
The first type appears in government budgets and includes subsidies on fertilizers, 
pesticides, and tube-wells. In implementing the subsidies, the government picks up the 
difference between the cost of input delivered to the farmers and the price actually paid 
by the farmer. The second type does not appear in government budgets and consists of 
subsidies on electricity, irrigation water and agricultural credit. The subsidy on irrigation 
is equal to the difference between the revenues collected from the farmers as water 
charges and the cost incurred by the government on operation and maintenance of the 
canal system excluding the capital costs (Qureshi, 1993). Agricultural credit subsidy is 
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the difference between the interest rate charged on agricultural loans and the rate charged 
on non-agricultural loans, and the subsidy on electricity is the difference between rates 
charged on electricity use in agriculture and in non-agriculture purpose (Qureshi, 1993). 
The subsidy on pesticides increased from Rs. 128 million in 1972 to Rs. 421 
million in 1977 but declined thereafter reaching 62 million in 1980-81. Pesticide subsidy 
was abolished in 1981-82 and the market was completely liberalized. The benefits of 
liberalization are visible from a remarkable growth in pesticide use. Subsidy on seed had 
been minor and was eliminated in 1982-83.  Currently, the private companies handle 
about 50% of the seed market mostly through imports. Punjab Seed Corporation and 
Sindh Seed Corporations are major state-owned seed agencies and operate under losses, 
discouraging private investment in seed farms. The subsidy on tube-wells that was 
abolished in 1994-95 varied across areas. The applicable rates for the 1cusec capacity 
were Rs.16000, 18000 and 20000/unit in non-perennial canal command area, the saline 
areas, and rain-fed areas respectively.  
Table 8 shows the subsidies to the agriculture sector since the mid 1980s. Of the 
budgeted subsidies, fertilizer subsidy was important until 1990. The subsidy on fertilizer 
started declining since and was removed after 1996. However, natural gas subsidy 
continues to the fertilizer producers. Before the denationalization in 1986, the 
government owned enterprises were heavily involved in fertilizer business. The fertilizer 
industry was deregulated in 1986 and a gradual reduction in subsidy was introduced, the 
subsidy on locally produced fertilizer was eliminated in 1993, while minor subsidy 
continued on imported fertilizer up to 1996. On the other hand, the government of 
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Pakistan has imposed 15% sales duty on all fertilizers and a 5% custom duty on imported 
fertilizer resulting into a negative subsidy on fertilizers. Currently, NFC a state-owned 
company registered as a private limited company controls about 50% of the domestically 
produced nitrogen and 80% of the phosphate fertilizer. Now, only the private sector 
imports and distributes fertilizers.13  
Table 8—Subsidies on agricultural inputs (million Rupees) 
Year Irrigation 
(Nominal) 
Irrigation 
(Real) 
Institutional 
Credit 
Electricity Fertilizer 
1984/85 828 627 543 103 1500 
1989/90 1410 779 1207 1380 1257 
1990/91 1545 757 1526 1625 1248 
1991/92 2701 1206 1744 1796 1191 
1992/93 3111 1275 1993 1724 810 
1993/94 2565 933 1980 330 583 
1994/95 3386 1082 1986 330 67 
1995/96 4203 1243 1000 349 47 
1996/97 4550 1185 1000 604 - 
1997/98 5111 1238 83 972 - 
1998/99 4237 967 437 1336 - 
1999/00 4608 1024 279 652 - 
Source: Chaudhry and Sahibzada (1995); Pakistan (2002a); Qureshi (1993); WTO notifications 
Note: No study is found that has actually computed the subsidies beyond 2000. 
 
There appears to be no significant impact of withdrawal of fertilizer subsidy on 
the use of nutrients. The ratio of nitrogenous to phosphatic fertilizer has however 
deteriorated after the mid 1980s mainly because of a faster increase in prices of 
phosphatic fertilizer after deregulation (Table 9). The worsening imbalance in nutrients 
has adverse implications for productivity of wheat and other important crops.  
                                                 
13----- There have been frequent disruptions in gas supply to the fertilizer producing industry due to 
attacks on gas pipelines by some fanatic groups. Government has to import urea to meet shortages in the 
country. Recently, the government of Pakistan has announced subsidy on imported urea fertilizer by fixing 
price of Rs. 450 per 50 kg bag of urea against the c.i.f Karachi price of Rs. 870 per bag. 
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Table 9—Per hectare fertilizer use, nutrient use ratio, and fertilizer prices 
Year NPK-Nutrients 
Kg/hectare 
N:P Ratio DAP (Rs./50kg) Urea (Rs./50kg) 
1979/80 54 3.53 75 75 
1984/85 63 3.18 133 128 
1989/90 88 3.84 217 185 
1994/95 99 4.06 379 235 
1998/99 113 4.51 665 346 
1999/00 123 3.71 649 327 
2000/01 135 3.34 670 363 
2001/02 132 3.66 710 394 
2002/03 138 3.61 765 411 
2003/04 140 3.75 913 420 
Source : Pakistan (2005 and previous issues) 
 
The government of Pakistan has pursued a multidimensional policy in advancing 
credit to the farmers. Subsidized loan called ‘taccavi’ were provided to the farmers for 
natural disaster like floods. The share of the advances under this scheme remained 
minimal in total credit over time. Taccavi scheme was discontinued in the mid 1990s. 
The second source of credit is from the Federal Bank of Cooperatives (FBC) established 
in 1976. The State Bank of Pakistan has been providing cheap credit to the FBC. The 
commercial banks are the third source for institutional agricultural credit. The specialized 
bank in this case is the Zarai Traqiati Bank Limited (ZTBL), formerly named as 
Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (ADBP).  Presently, it accounts for over 62% 
of the total agricultural credit. 
In order to streamline agricultural credit across sectors, the government has 
formed an Agricultural Credit Advisory Committee. Credit quotas are fixed for different 
farm sizes i.e. 70% of total production credit must go to the farmers with less than 12.5 
acres of land, 20% for farmers having land between 12.5 to 25 acres and only 10% is 
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fixed for cultivators with more than 25 acres. In reality, much of the share goes to the 
well off farmers. The subsidy on agricultural credit has declined recently from 1986 
million rupees in 1995 to 279 million rupees in 2000 (Table 8) as banks stopped 
advancing interest free short-term loans.  
The subsidy on electricity in agriculture has been an important part of total 
subsidy up to 1993. However, it has been mostly eliminated except in Baluchistan 
province where it continues as a flat rate on agricultural tube-wells. The exact amount of 
subsidy on electricity is not available except for the period 1995- 2000 reported in WTO 
notifications.14 The withdrawal of subsidy had an adverse effect on consumption of 
electricity in agriculture (Figure 1) 
                                                 
14Recently, Prime Minister of Pakistan has announced 33% subsidy on electricity consumed by agricultural 
tube-wells that will be equally shared by the Federal and Provincial Governments concerned and WAPDA 
(Rizvi, 2003)   
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Figure 1—Consumption of electricity in Pakistan and its provinces 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
1970 1980 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Pakistan Punjab Sindh NWFPP Baluch
Source: Annexure Table 4. 
 
A significant subsidy on irrigation water is provided to the farmers, which also is 
not budgeted. The subsidy has swelled in the last two decades in monetary terms: from 
828 million rupees in 1984-85 to 4,608 million rupees in 1999-2000. However, the 
subsidy has either declined or remained constant during the 1990s. Nonetheless it is in 
fact a big drain on the exchequer. Also, maintenance of the canal system has not been 
carried out since long resulting into declining water use efficiency and frequent breaching 
of canals and canal closures (Chaudhry et al., 2000). Due to lower and uncertain supply 
of canal water many farmers in saline areas are heavily pumping underground water 
leading to lowering of water table, adding further to salinity levels, and reducing 
productivity. 
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4. PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF GRAINS FOR FOOD 
SECURITY 
The marketing and distribution of food grains in Pakistan involves both private 
and public sector. The intermediaries engaged in marketing channels include village 
shopkeepers, Arthies (commission agents), wholesalers and Beoparies (traders). The 
grains reach the consumers either unprocessed or processed through processors/millers, 
wholesalers, and retailers. The private sector deals in all grains but wheat marketing has 
remained mainly with the public sector, while rice marketing is also now private sector 
activity. 
4.1. WHEAT MARKETING  
Government of Pakistan intervenes heavily in wheat marketing in order to ensure 
cheap and sustained food supply in the country. The federal and provincial governments 
procure wheat with the objectives of supporting producer incomes and stabilizing grain 
and flour prices for the consumers. 
The support price for wheat among other crops is worked out by the APCOM 
basically based on the cost of production. APCOM recommends the level of price to the 
MINFAL. The proposed support price is then circulated to the Planning Commission, 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce and a few other ministries for their feedback, 
and finally the proposal is sent to the cabinet for a decision (Faruqee, 2005). The support 
price is normally announced before the sowing of crop in order to enable the farmers to 
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respond to the price incentives. The support price represents a minimum floor price 
which the government protects through public procurement that in fact becomes de facto 
the procurement price for wheat (Dorosh, 2004). 
The MINFAL in consultation with the provincial food departments sets the 
overall wheat procurement targets. The wheat is then procured by the government 
agencies: PASSCO on behalf of federal government and food departments of the 
provinces (PFDs). Over the last two decades, the actual procured wheat has ranged 
between 15-45% of total production in the country. The PFDs have been procuring the 
major portion of wheat (63% in 1990,83% in 1999), and the remaining was procured by 
PASSCO. Punjab is the only surplus province in wheat, and up to 95% of the total 
procurement comes from this province (Table 10). The rest is procured mainly from 
Sindh. To achieve the procurement targets, usually the inter-provincial wheat movement 
(often inter-district movement also) is banned from May to August. 
The PASSCO and PFDs procure wheat directly from producers or through 
marketing agents. The suppliers are required to offer fair average quality (FAQ) for 
procurement. The supplier bears the transportation cost to the procurement centers while 
cost of shifting to government storage is borne by the Food Department. If the quality 
falls below the specification, the product is rejected. The limits on impurities are over 1% 
of dirt/dust in wheat, 5% in case of other grains and 5% for damaged and shriveled 
grains. The procurement centers accept wheat in bulk/lots of 10 bags or more of standard 
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weight of 100 kilograms. The bags are supplied by the procurement centers on loan or 
payment basis. 
Table 10—Wheat procurement from provinces by PFDs and PASSCO                        
  (‘000’ tonnes) 
Punjab Pakistan 
Year 
Procured % 
 
Sindh  
NWFP 
Balochistan Total 
Procured 
% of Total 
Production 
% by 
PASSCO 
% by 
PFDs 
Rice 
Procurement
1986-87  4101.7 81.46 815.9 117.5 5035.1 41.90 35.18 64.82 1285.2 
1987-88  2936.5 73.87 973.2 65.5 3975.2 31.36 30.29 69.71 834.4 
1988-89  2720 77.85 740 34 3494 24.23 31.40 68.60 1078.6 
1989-90  3394.4 82.09 694.7 45.8 4134.9 28.88 26.70 73.30 1334 
1990-91  3704.2 83.95 660.9 47.3 4412.4 30.29 37.03 62.97 816.5 
1991-92 2592 82.05 542 25 3159 20.14 25.85 74.15 491.9 
1992-93  2571 79.13 659 19 3249 20.11 30.58 69.42 954.5 
1993-94  3339 81.04 708 73 4120 27.08 29.85 70.15 831.2 
1994-95  2987 81.97 613 44 3644 21.43 32.97 67.03 283.5 
1995-96  3152 84.28 565 23 3740 22.12 30.48 69.52 205.4 
1996-97  2963 85.93 423 62 3448 20.71 22.90 77.10 - 
1997-98  2438 89.47 283 4 2725 14.58 26.38 73.62 - 
1998-99  3542 88.91 438 4 3984 22.31 17.44 82.56 - 
1999-00  3476 85.41 594 0 4070 19.31 18.36 81.64 - 
2000-01 7890 91.94 648 44 8582 45.11 24.25 75.75 - 
2001-02  3478 85.22 441 162 4081 22.39 23.02 76.98 - 
2002-03  3759 92.93 275 11 4045 21.09 22.44 77.56 - 
2003-04  3185 90.64 321 8 3514 18.02 * * - 
Source: Pakistan (2005); Salam (2003); * These figures were not available. 
 
Both PFDs and PASSCO, in addition to their storage facilities which is for about 
4.5 million tonnes for all food grains, rent space from the private sector. The PASSCO 
normally distributes wheat grains to the armed forces, Northern Areas and AJK. Some of 
the stock is also sold to the deficit provinces through the PFDs. The provincial food 
departments are responsible for the public distribution system and they release wheat on a 
predetermined pan-territorial issue price to the registered millers based on the quota 
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decided by the provincial and federal governments.15 The imported wheat is also routed 
through the PFDs for distribution at the same issue price.16 The system of uniform issue 
price which continued until 2001 did not cover all the costs involved from procurement to 
distribution. In May 2001 government introduced cascading release prices and linked the 
issue price for wheat from its stock to the month of delivery resulting into higher issue 
prices in the later months of the crop year. The major purpose of this system has been to 
reduce losses born by the government and to encourage the participation of private sector 
storage. But, we believe that the government will still keep the issue price lower than the 
market price and might not help much the trade in private sector.17 
The present public procurement and distribution system involves heavy subsidy 
ranging from Rs.2.75 billion in 1990/91 to Rs.12.35 billion in 2002/03 as import subsidy 
and the difference between procurement price and issue price and incidental costs (Table 
11). The major beneficiaries in this process are in general the flour mills, particularly 
some the selected/registered ones. Since the subsidized rates are applied only to the wheat 
purchased from the government that partially meets the full capacity of the industry, the 
                                                 
15 To meet the additional requirements the registered flour mills like other mills purchase wheat grain from 
the open market. 
16 The decision regarding the quantity to be imported and the procedures to be adopted is made however by 
the Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) which meets in June every year. The decision of the ECC is 
then implemented by MINFAL including financing and shipping from abroad. 
17 Restrictions on the movements of wheat within the provinces were removed in May 2001 in order to 
ensure smooth supply and widespread availability of food, and also help wheat producers to benefit from 
the price differentials. But, it never happened practically. The State Bank of Pakistan also allowed the 
banks to provide finance to the private sector's wheat purchases, and the other incentives include some tax 
exemptions and reduced import duties on materials and facilities used for grain handling and storage (FAO, 
2003). In principle the government has also allowed the private sector to participate in export/import of 
wheat. However, no data is available for the private sector. 
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additional requirement is met through buying from the open market. Consequently, the 
flour prices are almost determined by the market forces.18 
The wheat pricing and procurement system does not help the farming 
communities particularly the marginal/small farmers who generally have very small or no 
marketable surplus. Though marginal/small farmers buy back during later months of the 
year, they generally sell wheat grains in the market immediately after the harvest due 
mainly to two reasons. Firstly, it is obligatory for them to pay their loans acquired either 
in cash or against the deferred payment arrangements of which private 
traders/commission agents generally are the granters – violation could result in denial of 
such facilities in future. Second, the PFDs and PASSCO accept wheat grains in bulk of at 
least 10 bags of 100kg each. Third, generally the PFDs -- the main procurer of wheat, 
operate in the grain markets through commission agents and do not have their own 
procurement centers.  
4.2. RICE MARKETING 
Rice procurement/trade had remained a monopoly of the government for a long 
period. Government used to purchase rice mainly through dealers at the procurement 
                                                 
18The provision of cheaper wheat grain resulting into setting up more and more flour mills in the country by 
the influential to get advantage of subsidized  wheat, while in fact there is already 70% over-capacity 
(Arshad, 2005).The rent seeking activities in public procurement and distribution system are pervasive and 
thus cannot be ignored. During the ban on wheat movement, some traders do sell outside the districts at 
higher prices unlawfully. The bribe for such movement has been as high as Rs.4000/truck in recent years 
amounting over 4% of the market price (Dorosh, 2004). The misuse of quota in supplying wheat to the 
flourmills is also significant. Smith et al. (1999) conclude that nearly 70% of the listed mills in Sanghar 
district in Sindh province are not operational and 40% of them do not even exist. Moreover, allocation of 
quota in excess of mills’ capacity is also common. 
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centers in the controlled areas. However, the growers were allowed to pool to form 
required lots of 240 bags. The dealers used to get the paddy processed into rice only from 
the authorized mills and the government had bans on rural rice husking mills in 
controlled areas during procurement season. No dealer was allowed to remove rice from 
the mills without obtaining a disposal order from the food department. 
Rice marketing is now with private sector, but it remains subject to the support 
price mechanism, managed by PASSCO, although no paddy procurement has been 
reported since 1995/96 (Table 10). 
Table 11—Total federal and provincial budgeted subsidy (million Rupees) 
Year Provincial Subsidy Federal Subsidy Total Subsidy Real Subsidya 
1990-91 1988 762 2750 6322 
1991-92 1831 2175 4006 8451 
1992-93 1325 2148 3473 6666 
1993-94 2760 354 3114 5378 
1994-95 1890 1449 3339 5098 
1995-96 3169 6648 9817 13522 
1996-97 5173 5761 10934 13482 
1997-98 2443 4119 6562 7499 
1998-99 9375 - 9375 10135 
1999-00 6045 923 6968 7273 
2000-01 5502 1356 6858 6858 
2001-02 5940 2668 8608 8317 
2002-03 6671 5681 12352 11566 
Source: Faruqee (2005). a Real subsidy computed using CPI assuming 2000-01=100. 
4.3. BASIC TENETS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN WHEAT 
 ECONOMY  
Wheat price has been a politically sensitive issue. Therefore, the government has 
used instruments to achieve the following objectives: 1) protect the producers from price 
fluctuations through the guaranteed minimum support price; 2) achieve desired output 
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targets; 3) induce adoption of new technologies; 4) shield consumers against rise in prices 
particularly the urban consumers; and 5) ensure food security.  
5. EFFICIENCY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXISTING 
SYSTEM VIS-À-VIS PRIVATE AGENTS/PRODUCERS 
5.1. EFFECTS OF POLICY ON PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS 
Below, we review the effects of price policy based on three aspects: a) Comparing 
terms of trade in agriculture relative to consumer prices, international commodity prices 
and domestic input prices; b) Resource transfers from the agriculture to non-agriculture 
sector; and c) Monthly wholesale price of wheat and the support price. 
5.1.1  Aggregate Terms of Trade 19  
The changes in crops prices20 relative to consumer prices, international prices of 
agricultural commodities, and domestic input prices21 (also called terms of trade – TOT) 
can be helpful to evaluate the profitability of the farm sector, and changes in standard of 
living of the farming community. Zahid and Hyder (1986) analyzing the terms of trade 
concluded that the increase in producer prices relative to the consumer price index 
remained lower than the base year during 1973-83. .  
Figure 2 indicates that the increase in producer price index was relatively less 
than the consumer price index during 1983 to 2003 except for the duration of 1997-2000, 
                                                 
19 This section benefited heavily from Khan and Ahmad (2005) 
20 Included commodities are wheat, rice, maize, bajra, jowar, barley, sugarcane, cotton, gram, moong, 
mash, masoor, onion, potato, tomato, mango, banana, apple, guava and citrus: Annual wholesale prices 
were used. 
21  Inputs include fertilizer, diesel oil, water, and pesticides. 
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and the farming community remained relatively worse off. Nonetheless, the TOT has 
improved since the mid 1990s.  
Figure 2—Aggregate Terms of Trade in Agriculture 
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The trend in relative producer price index with respect to international commodity 
prices shows that the terms of trade were favorable for almost half of the reference 
period. Interestingly, a regular 3-4 years cycle can be observed. However, the variations 
in the cycles have reduced overtime. Two factors can be hypothesized for these cyclical 
trends: 1) the government of Pakistan announce support/procurement prices for various 
crops and keeps them at the same level for a couple of years; and 2) the government 
interventions have declined significantly over time in compliance with the World Bank 
and IMF conditionalities as well as World Trade Organization.. 
Zahid and Hyder (1986) show  that the producer price index relative to input 
prices remained in favor of farming community from 1973 to 1983, most importantly 
owing to the  input subsidies. Figure 7.2 shows that domestic producer prices of crops 
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relative to the major agricultural input prices remained below the base year (i.e. 1983) 
except for the period from 1997 to 2000 – prices of most of the agricultural commodities 
were fixed at a significantly higher level during this period.  
5.1.2  Nominal and Effective Protection Coefficients 
The policy effects on agricultural incentives can also be evaluated by comparing 
the domestic prices with the parity prices obtained by adjusting the world prices with 
transportation and other costs. The nominal protection coefficient (NPC) measures the 
actual divergence between domestic price and international price, and relates only to the 
distortions in the output market. The effective protection coefficient (EPC) measures the 
net effect of government interventions upon value-added in any production process and 
incorporates distortions in the inputs markets as well. The NPC and EPC measures for 
1960-2002 of major agricultural commodities and of wheat for the latest years are given 
in Table 12. The values greater than one imply protection indicating positive incentives. 
The values less than one imply disincentive for production. 
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Table 12—The nominal and effective protection coefficients for selected   
  commodities 
Year Wheat 
(NPC)     EPC    
Basmati 
(NPC)      EPC    
IRRI 
(NPC)  EPC 
Cotton 
(NPC)   EPC 
Sugarcane 
EPC  (NPC) 
1960-61  (1.20)    1.24    (0.84)     0.85 (1.05)      1.07 (2.71)    2.75    
1965-66  (1.54)    1.56    (0.90)     0.92 (1.03)     1.04 (3.83)    3.85    
1970-71  (1.59)    1.56    (0.84)     0.83 (0.87)   0.87 (1.20)     1.19 (2.15)    2.13    
1975-76  (0.84)    0.82    (0.50)     0.49 (0.75)    0.75 (0.68)     0.68 (0.68)    0.68    
1982-83  (0.73)    0.70    (0.46)     0.38 (0.95)    1.01 (0.92)     0.95 (0.75)    0.73    
1983-84  (0.55)    0.47    (0.46)     0.37 (0.96)    0.96 (0.77)     0.73        (0.96)    
1999-00  (0.90)    0.84*    (0.80)     0.74 (0.90)    0.88 (0.61)     0.48        (1.08)    
2000-01  (0.79)    0.69*    (0.79)     0.75 (1.30)    1.54 (0.99)     0.94        (0.83)    
2001-02  (0.64)    0.52*    (0.76)     0.72 (1.24)    1.45 (1.05)    1.00        (0.95)    
2002-03  (0.63)         (1.12)  
2003-04  (0.64)       (1.02)  
2004-05  (0.76)       (1.00)  
Source : EPCs for the years 1960-61 to 1975-76 are Gotsch and Brown (1980), from 1982-83 and 1983-
84 are from Appleyard (1987), and the other measures are author’s own calculations. NPC for the 
years 2002-03 to 2004-05 from Orden and Salam. 
Note : Figures in parentheses are NPCs for the same years. * EPCs do not incorporate inputs subsidies. 
 
Table 12 shows that all major crops except Basmati rice were highly protected 
against the international prices during the 1960s. However, the domestic price relative to 
international prices had started falling during the late 1960s. Afterward, NPCs and EPCs 
for IRRI rice, cotton and sugarcane either remained higher than or close to one except for 
a few years. On the other hand, these measures for wheat and basmati rice remained 
significantly lower than one. Two other important conclusions can be drawn from Table 
12. First, Basmati rice growers are the most adversely affected by the policy disincentives 
followed by the wheat growers; and second, IRRI rice and cotton growers are relatively 
better off followed by sugarcane growers.22 
                                                 
22 Recently, government of Pakistan has decided to discourage the sowing of those crops where there is no 
comparative advantage and consumes huge water resources, e.g. sugarcane and IRRI rice. 
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5.1.3  Effects on supply and demand and net resource transfers 
Evaluating policy interventions, Hamid et al. (1990) show that production of 
major crops under interventions has been lower compared to no interventions. The study 
estimates that the wheat output would have been higher by 10 to 17% during the 1960s 
23and 1970s, while production would have been higher by 14% during 1980s. However, 
in basmati rice, the underproduction was 25% and 40% during 1970s and 1980s. Dorosh 
and Valdes (1990) concluded that production of wheat was lower by 24% and basmati 
rice by 52% during 1978-87 owing to government interventions. The farm income 
without intervention could have been higher by 40%. The study further indicated that 
without intervention, Pakistan could have been a wheat exporter. Hamid et al. (1990) 
concluded that the consumption of all crops except sugar was higher than it would have 
been without interventions. The over-consumption in wheat was in the range of 6 to 12%. 
Ashfaq, Griffith and Parton (2001) analyzing welfare impact of wheat price 
policies conclude that net welfare loss to the society ranged from about Rs.11billion 
during 1993-96 to about Rs.27 billion in 1974-75. These losses ranged from about 4% to 
15% of the GDP from agriculture sector. The flow of transfers has been from producers 
and government to the consumers (Barkley, 1992; Ashfaq, Griffith and Parton, 2001). 
Abedullah and Ali (2001) found that the support price benefits both the producers and the 
consumers, and imposes a heavy cost on the government exchequer. The cost is higher 
                                                 
23 Nonetheless, Hamid et al. (1990) has also shown that there was price protection for wheat during 1960s 
except for a few years, which does not match with this result regarding under production in wheat.  
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than the ensuing benefits to the producers and consumers, resulting in a net loss to 
society. 
To summarize, government interventions in agriculture resulted in huge net 
resource transfers from the agriculture sector to the other sectors of the economy. These 
transfers have been about Rs.25 billion per annum during 1978-87 (Dorosh and Valdes, 
1990), while a recent study, Chaudhry (2001), shows that the resource transfer in nominal 
terms varied from Rs. 40 billion in 1984-85 to Rs. 214 billion per annum in 1999-2000. 
5.2. COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM 
With rising incomes and urbanization, the demand for an efficient marketing 
structure goes up (Kurosaki, 1996). Market inefficiencies take away significant amount 
of public and private resources, increase price risk and discourage investment 
(Deomampo, 1997; Kurosaki, 1996). This section looks at different marketing efficiency 
parameters such as marketing margins, market integration and the cost of public and 
private distribution. 
5.2.1  Marketing margins 
The marketing efficiency can be assessed by quality, quantity and price to 
consumers and the net returns to producers. The market inefficiencies lead to greater 
difference between producer and consumer prices (the marketing margin). The higher 
marketing costs or/and profits of the intermediaries could be the reasons of inflated 
market margins. The higher costs are usually a result of poor market infrastructure (like 
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roads, transport, storage, and utility services), high post harvest losses, lack of grading, 
and improper handling of the products. The marketing profits are greater in marketing 
involving greater risk of losses, exploitative system and greater investment. 
In Pakistan, certain commodities involve very high marketing margins, 45% for 
onions and 85% for banana where the big part comprises the intermediaries’ profits 
(Siddiqui, 1979; Mohyuddin, 1992; Khushk and Smith, 1996; Mustafa and Iqbal, 1996; 
Khushk et al., nd; and Lashari et al, 2002). In onions, only 5% is attributable to costs, the 
rest 40% is made up of the profit of the intermediaries, in banana, it involves 49% profit 
and 30% marketing cost. Pulses also involve huge marketing margins ranging from 55% 
to 74% dominated by profits shared by various intermediaries (Siddiqui, 1979). Since the 
prices of wheat and wheat flour are controlled by the government, the marketing margins 
are generally not high. The marketing margin for wheat varies from 5% in grains to 58% 
in case of milled wheat.  
5.2.2 Market integration 
Competitiveness of markets can be evaluated based on how the price formation is 
interrelated (over time and space). High association between prices overtime and space 
indicates good integration and the price signals are expected to operate properly. Qureshi 
(1974) estimated the correlation coefficients between the price movements in village 
markets and wholesale markets for six commodities, wheat, cotton, Gur, oilseeds, gram 
and paddy and concluded that the markets are well integrated. Mohammad (1977) using 
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average weekly wholesale prices data for wheat in 12 districts supported the results of 
Qureshi (1974). 
Kurosaki (1996) concluded that in case of wheat, the farm-gate prices are almost 
perfectly explained by the government support price and the distance from the town. 
Despite most farmers selling their wheat to private traders and not to the procurement 
centers, the farm-gate prices are integrated with the support price in the town. This 
follows from active competition among private traders and substantial procurement by 
the government. However, the government releases significantly influence market price 
of wheat and keep them suppressed. The farm-gate price of basmati paddy was not 
explained well by the support price which according to Kurosaki followed negligible 
procurement of Basmati by the government. 
Tahir and Riaz (1997) using weekly prices of cotton, wheat and rice in selected 
markets of southern Punjab concluded that the agricultural markets are integrated in the 
long run with short run integration only in special cases. The study indicated only long 
run integration of wheat markets since wheat is heavily regulated and the procurement 
centers actively participate in purchases at the time of harvest and few months after . 
Besides, the movement is banned for few months after the harvest. Therefore, wheat 
markets are expected to be less integrated in the short-run. 
5.2.3  Incidental Costs 
During the procurement and distribution operations, the parastatals incur heavy 
costs. The increasing incidentals and the narrow difference between the procurement and 
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release prices of wheat continued to be a matter of great concern. High incidentals also 
make the exports of wheat uncompetitive in the international market (Slam, 2003). Table 
13 shows that the PFD incidentals ranged from Rs.920 to Rs.2350 per tonne during 
1996/97 to 2002/03, while for PASSCO the range was from Rs.1218 to Rs. 2431 per 
tonne during the same period. The difference between incidental costs of these two 
parastatals has mainly been due to the use of gunny bags (Slam, 2003). 
The comparison of the incidentals with that of the private traders shows that the 
private sector incidentals ranged from Rs.1427 to Rs.1920 during the last couple of years 
and are much lower than of the state-owned enterprises (Table 13). 
Table 13—Incidentals in wheat procurement and storage (Rs/tonne) 
 PFD PASSCO Private 
1996/97 919.6 1217.59  
1997/98 1079.87 1718.99  
1998/99 1439.95 1778.85  
1999/00 1482.22 1906.44  
2000/01 1637.35 1680.73 1687-1920 
2001/02 2130.6 2125.83  
2002/03 2350 2430.96 1427-1730 
Source : Slam (2003).
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6. WELFARE ANALYSIS OF WHEAT POLICY 
In order to analyze the welfare impacts of the wheat policy in Pakistan, we 
construct a CGE model and calibrate it to the 2001-02 social accounting matrix (SAM) 
developed by Dorosh, Niazi and Nazli (2004). We conduct policy experiments to analyze 
the household effects of possible reforms in wheat policy. Before explaining the results of 
the CGE model, the structure of wheat economy – based on a simple analysis, and how 
the wheat production activity is linked with the overall economy – using SAM, are 
briefly discussed. 
6.1. WHEAT MARKETING FLOWS: CONSUMER SUBSIDIES AND PRODUCER 
 TAXES  
Wheat policy and marketing are complex . To obtain a basic idea about wheat 
marketing and government subsidies involved, we do a very simple analysis (see 
Annexure Table 6) for the period 1996-97 to 1999-00 for which the government storage 
cost is available. Average wheat production in the country during this period was about 
18.6 million tones ranging from 16.7 million tones in 1996-97 to 21.1 million tones in 
1999-00. On an average, about 35% (i.e. 6.5 million tones) of the produce is normally 
kept on farms for home consumption or to sell later in the open market. About 10% of the 
total produce is reserved for feed, seed etc. 
Net average sale in the open market was 5.38 million tones, while average 
government purchase was 4.85 million tones during this period. Government imports on 
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average remained around 2.79 million tones ranging from 2.33 million tones in 1998-99 
to 4.11 million tones in 1997-98. On an average, about 19.5 million tones of wheat were 
available for human consumption in the country during 1996 to 2000. 
Average support price was Rs.6375/tone, while average storage and transportation 
cost afforded by the government was Rs.1443/tone/year. Consequently adjusted price for 
wheat procured and distributed by government came out Rs.7818/tone. Average 
wholesale price in Lahore market remained around Rs.6804 ranging from Rs.5475/tonne 
in 1996-97 to Rs.7415/tonne in 1997-98, which was higher than the support price. 
Government issued wheat grain stock to millers at the average rate of 
Rs.6463/tone, which was 18% lower than its own cost per unit and 5% lower than the 
wholesale price in the open market. To meet the shortages, government also imported 
wheat at a price of about Rs.7818/tonne (import parity at Lahore). Assuming the 
government stores imported wheat for at least 6 months resulting into cost of imported 
wheat equal to Rs.9509/tones. The imported wheat is also sold to millers on the same 
release price as the domestic wheat, i.e. Rs.6463/tonne. The difference between cost of 
imported wheat and the release price was Rs.3046/tonne resulting in a 32% subsidy 
provided by the government. 
The overall produce of the farmers is evaluated as follows: produce kept for own 
consumption, the quantity sold in the open market and the quantity used for feed, seed 
and etc are valued on average wholesale Lahore market price. Though the quality of the 
wheat grain used for feed may be relatively poor than the average quality wheat, but on 
the other hand wheat used for seed is usually of higher quality. Thus, it is reasonable to 
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use average wholesale price to value this quantity. The total value of output sold either to 
the government, in open market or kept at home for self-consumption turns out to be 
Rs.125.86 billion. On the other hand if the farm output is valued on import parity prices, 
then it would be Rs.163.81 billion. This difference is over 23.17% implying that the 
farmers are being taxed equivalent to 23.17%. 
The government wheat procurement costs worth Rs.39.74 billion – includes storage 
and transportation cost, and cost of imported wheat (Rs.26.70 billion). The total operation 
thus costs Rs.66.44 billion.  Government releases/sells wheat to millers at the same issue 
price irrespective of the origin of purchase – imported or domestically procured wheat. 
On an average, the sale value of wheat was Rs.51.70 billion costing government Rs.14.74 
billion every year. 
Flourmills purchase fixed quantity/quota of wheat from the government and the rest 
for milling is purchased from the open market. Government sells wheat to the millers at a 
price lower than its cost incurred on procurement and storage. Consequently, the rent to 
the millers is the difference between government cost per tone of wheat and the wheat 
release price per tone, which was equal to Rs.1355/tonne. Profit of the millers can be 
computed as the difference between the issue price and the wholesale price, which was 
equal to Rs.342/tone. Consequently, average gain of the millers per tone was Rs.1697. As 
a result total subsidy enjoyed by the millers was equal to the average gain per tone 
multiplied by the total quantity of wheat procured either domestically or imported. This 
amount equals Rs.11.05 billion. 
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Basically, non-farm rural and urban consumers buy wheat/wheat flour from the 
open market. Millers sell wheat-flour in the market without differentiating the source of 
purchase for wheat grains. On the other hand, on-farm consumption of wheat is also 
valued at the market price. One of the objectives of the government interventions is to 
keep food prices within affordable range for the consumers. If government does not 
intervene in the market and leave the market forces to function, the wheat price will move 
towards international price level. The difference between domestic wholesale price and 
the import parity price multiplied by the quantity consumed is the partial equilibrium24 
welfare gain to the consumers. However, we shall recompute this using our model to get 
a sense of the general equilibrium welfare gain to the consumers. The wedge between 
these two prices is about 22.24%. In value terms consumers’ partial welfare gain from the 
existing policy was about Rs.38.27 billion. 
The partial equilibrium total producer welfare loss was Rs.37.96 billion and the 
policy costs to government by about Rs.14.74 billion, while millers’ gain from the wheat 
policy was Rs.11.05 billion. The resulting loss to the society was about Rs.3.37 billion 
comprised mainly of the difference between the gain to the millers and subsidy provided 
by the government that appears unaccounted for in the system.  
 This simple, partial equilibrium analysis already highlights the fact that 
consumers are subsidized at the cost of the farmers, and the millers absorb almost the 
whole subsidy provided by the government to implement wheat policy. We now turn to 
                                                 
24 Partial equilibrium in the sense that the impact on prices of the rest of the commodities is not taken into 
account. 
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our CGE model to get a sense of the general equilibrium effects of removing these price 
distortions on wheat. For our policy experiments, we recalibrate our model to reflect the 
decade of 1990s where the import share remained around about 10%. However, 
production tax and consumption subsidy were 23%, and 22% respectively25 (computed 
from Annexure Table 6).  
6.2  SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX (SAM) 
The discussion in this section focuses on the structure of production, foreign 
trade, household consumption expenditure and sources of their income. 
Production Sectors: The SAM 2001-02 has 34 production sectors: 12 sectors 
relate to agriculture, 17 belong to industry, and 5 sectors to services. Wheat production is 
divided into activities -- irrigated and non-irrigated, while wheat milling is considered as 
single sector. Paddy production is separated into ‘paddy IRRI -- course varieties’ and 
‘paddy basmati – aromatic varieties’, and the rice milling was also divided into two 
categories as well.  
The SAM shows that 66.2% of total wheat production26 goes to wheat milling, 
25.9% to the livestock sector27, 1.8% to poultry, and 6.1% to rest of the sectors (Table 
14). Moreover, wheat is an intermediate commodity with zero final demand by end-users. 
The output of wheat milling is mainly wheat flour, which is a final commodity with 85.6 
                                                 
25 In Annexure Table 6, production tax is computed using information under the ‘Average’ column and the 
following rows using the formula:  (1-row AA/row AB) *100.  Consumption subsidy is (1-row AH/row 
AM)*100. 
26 Wheat activity includes grain and its by-products, i.e. wheat straw etc.  
27 Livestock includes cattle and dairy. Poultry is in a separate account. 
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% demanded by the consumers, and only 14.4% absorbed as an intermediate input in the 
rest of the production system (Table 14).  
Table 14—Link of wheat with other major sectors,% 
Structure of Demand for Wheat Grain*  
Final demand:  
by consumers 0.0 
Intermediate demand:  
by wheat milling 66.2 
by livestock** 25.9 
by poultry 1.8 
by others 6.1 
Structure of demand for Wheat milling (flour)  
Final demand:  
by consumers 85.6 
Intermediate demand:  
by other intermediate demand 14.4 
Structure of Inputs of Wheat Milling  
Intermediate input:  
From wheat grain 44.1 
From others 34.1 
Primary factors 21.8 
Structure of Inputs of Livestock**  
Intermediate input:  
From wheat grain 5.0 
From others 41.8 
Primary factors 53.2 
 Source: 2001-02 Social Accounting Matrix. 
 * Wheat is composed of wheat grain and its by-products. 
 ** Includes cattle and diary only. 
 
In terms of value added, agricultural and industrial sectors contribute about 23% 
each to the total, while the service sector contributes more than 50%. Within the 
agricultural sector, livestock sector has more than 10% share, while wheat production 
(irrigated and non-irrigated combined) contributes less than 2%. In the industrial sector, 
the combined share of textile and cotton lint and yarn is 5%, while wheat milling shares 
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only 1.2%. In terms of total output in the country, overall agriculture contributes 20% 
while the industrial sector shares 38%.  
In overall activities of the agriculture sector, the value addition is about 57%, while 43% 
is being absorbed as intermediate inputs (Table 15). However, the value addition in 
industrial sector (i.e. 30 percent) is much lower than the agriculture. 
Within the agriculture sector, forestry and ‘other crops category’28 have higher 
value added ratios than the rest of the sub-sectors. These ratios in industrial sector are 
lower in all sub-sectors relative to mining, energy and cement. In terms of capital-labor 
ratios, the industrial sub-sectors have generally higher ratios than that in the agriculture 
sector, except livestock and poultry sub-sectors. 
Table 15 further shows that the foreign trade sector is relatively small compared 
to the overall domestic sector. Only 10% of the total production goes in the export 
market, and the share of imports in the commodities is only 14.5%. 
 
                                                 
28 Includes all other crops except wheat, paddy, sugarcane, cotton, all fruits and vegetables, and forestry. 
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Table 15—Elasticities and parameters   
  Production (%) 
 Trade Value- Value-
added 
Output Capital- 
 Elasticities Exports (%) Imports (%) Added 
Ratio 
Share Share Labor 
Sectors Armington CET Share Intensity 
(a) 
Share Intensity 
(b) 
va ÷ (x) va÷(total 
va) 
x÷(total 
x) 
Ratio 
(c) 
Wheat irrigated**                 1.1 0.6 3.6 0.3 2.5 50.8 1.8 1.8 0.3 
Wheat non-irrigated                                                                                 50.9 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Paddy IRRI                                                                                  60.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 
Paddy basmati                                                                                  60.2 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Cotton                                                                                  61.2 1.4 1.1 0.3 
Sugarcane                                                                                  60.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 
Other major crops* 3.3 3.3 0.5 2.7 0.6 4.5 71.0 2.8 2.0 0.3 
Fruits  & vegetables* 1.9 1.9 1.1 3.8 1.3 6.9 64.2 3.6 2.8 0.6 
Livestock, cattle, dairy* 2.0 2.0 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.1 53.2 10.3 9.7 9.0 
Poultry* 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 51.6 0.7 0.7 9.0 
Forestry* 2.5 2.5 0.5 31.4 0.2 25.2 82.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 
Fishing Industry* 1.3 1.3 1.1 23.8 0.0 0.1 57.1 0.6 0.5 2.3 
Agriculture   3.9 1.9 3.1 2.4 57.4 23.2 20.1  
Mining* 2.8 2.8 0.8 18.6 9.3 80.5 74.6 0.6 0.4 2.3 
Vegetable oil* 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 2.3 20.0 7.9 0.2 1.4 6.7 
Wheat milling 1.1 1.1 0.5 1.8 0.8 4.3 21.8 1.2 2.8 4.4 
Rice milling IRRI* 2.6 2.6 1.7 46.6 0.0 0.0 30.7 0.2 0.4 3.7 
Rice milling Basmati* 2.6 2.6 2.3 28.6 0.0 0.0 29.0 0.5 0.8 3.7 
Sugar* 2.7 2.7 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.9 32.2 1.4 2.2 3.3 
Other food* 2.0 2.0 12.1 51.5 1.1 12.4 36.9 1.7 2.3 4.7 
Cotton lint, yarn* 3.8 3.8 9.0 27.1 0.7 4.3 21.6 1.4 3.3 3.3 
Textiles* 3.8 3.8 31.9 39.7 1.6 4.8 22.2 3.6 8.0 2.7 
Leather* 4.1 4.1 2.3 42.8 0.1 5.2 8.3 0.1 0.5 2.9 
Wood products* 3.4 3.4 0.0 0.3 0.6 8.6 36.3 0.7 0.9 1.8 
Chemicals* 3.3 3.3 1.4 15.9 11.2 69.9 28.2 0.5 0.9 3.8 
Cement, bricks*                 2.9 0.0 0.2                            55.0 1.4 1.3 7.4 
Petroleum refining* 2.1                                       9.7 50.1 19.4 0.6 1.5 2.9 
Other manufacturing* 3.8 3.8 16.6 33.2 54.0 71.0 25.4 2.6 5.0 2.6 
Energy                                                                                  60.8 3.4 2.8 4.0 
Construction                                                                                 41.6 3.2 3.8 0.4 
Industry   78.6 20.5 91.6 31.4 30.3 23.3 38.4  
Commerce 1.1 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 84.0 15.3 9.1 0.4 
Transport                 1.1 17.4 15.9                            53.9 11.8 10.9 1.5 
Housing                                                                                  81.8 4.9 3.0  
Private services 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 5.0 6.0 53.5 12.9 12.0 1.5 
Public services                                                                                 66.2 8.6 6.5  
Services   17.5 4.2 5.2 2.0 64.3 53.5 41.5  
Total   100.0 10.0 100.0 14.5 49.8 100.0 100.0  
Source: 2001-2002 Social Accounting Matrix of Pakistan. 
             va-value added; x- output; CET-constant elasticity of transformation  
            *Half of recent GTAP elasticities (Hertel, et al, 2004),  
            ** imported and domestic wheat are perfect substitutes.  
            (a) export ÷ output; (b) imports ÷ composite good; (c) total labor ÷ total capital in I.   
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However, large variation is observed across sectors: For example, export intensity 
ratio (EIR)29 in forestry and fisheries are 31.4% and 23.8% respectively, while the ratio in 
the rest of agriculture sub-sectors is almost zero. The EIR in agriculture is only 1.9%, 
while it is 20.5% in the industrial sector. Within the industrial sector, ‘other food’ has the 
highest EIR, i.e. 51.5%, followed by ‘rice milling IRRI’ of 46.6%. The EIR in leather is 
42.8%, while the textile sub-sector shows 39.7%. In terms of the sector wise contribution 
to overall exports from the country, textile shares 31.9% followed by transport 17.4 
percent. The overall contribution of the unprocessed agricultural commodities towards 
total exports is only 3.9%. 
The industrial sector has a high import intensity ratio (IIR)30, i.e. 31.4% (Table 
15). Within the industrial sector, mining has IIR of 80.5% followed by ‘other 
manufacturing’ 71% and chemicals 69.9%. The IIR in petroleum sub-sector is also high, 
i.e. 50.1%. In terms of import share, ‘other manufacturing’ captures 54% of the overall 
imports. 
The Household Sector: There are 19 household groups in the 2001-02 SAM, 
which are defined in Table 17. The household categorization is based on location, size of 
land holdings, rural and urban, and poor and non-poor. The structure of consumption of 
each of the household groups is presented in Table 16. Among the commodities the 
livestock sub-sector has the largest share in the consumption basket of the households but 
                                                 
29Export intensity ratio is defined as the sector’s export divided by its output. 
 
30Import intensity ratio is defined as the sector’s imports divided by its total domestic supply. 
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there is substantial variation across household groups ranging from 24.9% for the 
household group h14 to 14.4% for the groups h3 and h6. 
The wheat milling along with transport, textile, other manufacturing, and ‘fruits 
and vegetables’ also come under the major consumption expenditure categories. For 
wheat milling the expenditure share varies from 11.7% in household group h15 to 4.4% 
in groups h2 and h5.  
Table 16—Consumption share 
 Households 
Commodities h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 
Other major crops  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  
Fruits_ vegetables 4.8  4.4  5.7  4.8  4.4  5.7  5.6  5.2  6.1  6.6  
Livestock, cattle, dairy 19.9  22.8  14.4  19.9  22.8  14.4  19.5  26.1  21.6  19.3  
Poultry 1.1  1.2  1.7  1.1  1.2  1.7  1.1  1.0  1.4   
Forestry 0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  
Fishing Industry 1.9  0.0  0.5  1.9  0.0  0.5  2.5  0.0  0.1  2.7  
Mining 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Vegetable oil 2.9  2.8  2.7  2.9  2.8  2.7  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.4  
Wheat milling 6.9  4.4  7.5  6.9  4.4  7.5  6.6  6.4  7.4  8.2  
Rice milling IRRI 0.7  0.2  0.2  0.7  0.2  0.2  1.2  0.2  0.2  1.1  
Rice milling Basmati 2.5  0.6  0.7  2.5  0.6  0.7  4.2  0.8  0.8  4.0  
Sugar 5.0  3.6  5.3  5.0  3.6  5.3  4.9  4.8  7.3  5.9  
Other food 1.2  0.9  1.3  1.2  0.9  1.3  1.2  1.0  1.9  1.6  
Cotton lint, yarn                                                                                                                 
Textiles 5.5  6.6  4.9  5.5  6.6  4.9  6.0  6.2  5.3  6.7  
Leather 0.2  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  
Wood products                                                                                                                  
Chemicals 3.0  4.3  4.9  3.0  4.3  4.9  1.9  2.2  1.8  0.5  
Cement, bricks 0.9  1.2  1.4  0.9  1.2  1.4  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.1  
Petroleum refining 0.5  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.8  0.7  
Other manufacturing 5.8  8.4  9.6  5.8  8.4  9.6  3.7  4.4  3.5  1.0  
Energy 0.6  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7  1.0  0.9  
Commerce 3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.4  
Transport 13.5  13.6  13.6  13.5  13.6  13.6  13.3  13.4  13.3  13.1  
Housing 1.4  1.6  2.4  1.4  1.6  2.4  1.5  1.3  1.8  1.9  
Private services 14.5  14.7  14.6  14.5  14.7  14.6  14.4  14.4  14.4  14.2  
Public services 3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.3  
  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
Source: 2001-2002 Social Accounting Matrix of Pakistan. 
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Table 16—Consumption share - continued 
 Households 
Commodities h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16 h17 h18 h19 
Other major crops 0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  
Fruits_ vegetables 6.2  7.0  6.0  6.5  7.1  6.0  6.7  6.2  6.9  
Livestock, cattle, dairy 22.3  17.5  20.7  24.9  15.9  19.9  17.9  18.3  18.0  
Poultry 1.0  1.4  0.7  0.9  1.5  1.4  1.0  1.7  1.1  
Forestry 0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Fishing Industry 0.0  0.2  1.2             0.3  0.9  0.7  0.8  0.6  
Mining 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Vegetable oil 3.6  3.4  3.2  3.4  3.8  3.2  3.9  2.7  3.8  
Wheat milling 7.7  8.3  10.9  9.1  11.7  6.0  10.3  4.0  9.1  
Rice milling IRRI 0.2  0.2  0.6  0.3  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.2  0.4  
Rice milling Basmati 0.8  0.7  2.3  1.0  0.5  1.1  1.7  0.9  1.5  
Sugar 5.5  8.2  8.2  5.8  9.6  5.0  7.0  3.3  5.8  
Other food 1.2  1.9  1.5  1.0  2.2  1.6  1.5  1.9  1.6  
Cotton lint, yarn             0.0              
Textiles 6.5  5.3  6.1  6.8  5.1  5.8  6.6  5.8  6.8  
Leather 0.3  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4  
Wood products        0.0             
Chemicals 2.1  2.3  0.4  0.9  1.2  2.9  1.3  3.5  1.4  
Cement, bricks 0.6  0.6  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.8  0.4  1.0  0.4  
Petroleum refining 0.7  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.9  1.0  
Other manufacturing 4.0  4.4  0.8  1.8  2.2  5.7  2.5  6.9  2.7  
Energy 0.8  0.9  0.8  0.7  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.2  
Commerce 3.5  3.5  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.5  3.4  3.4  3.4  
Transport 13.3  13.3  13.1  13.1  13.2  13.4  13.2  13.1  13.0  
Housing 1.7  1.8  1.6  1.5  1.8  2.5  1.7  6.3  3.5  
Private services 14.4  14.4  14.1  14.2  14.3  14.4  14.3  14.1  14.1  
Public services 3.3  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.3  
  100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: 2001-2002 Social Accounting Matrix of Pakistan 
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 The sources of household income include labor, capital, land and water, dividend, 
and the rest of the world.31 Table 17 shows that the urban poor receives about 76.2% of 
their income from non-agricultural unskilled wages, and about 18% from capital – 
exclusively informal. The major portion of income for the urban non-poor households 
comes from two sources: ‘other income’ (44.2%) -- largely dividend income32 and non-
agricultural skilled wages (i.e., 33.3%). The main sources of income for rural non-farm 
households include informal capital (i.e. 63.4%) and non-agricultural unskilled wages 
(29.7%). On the other hand rural non-farm non-poor receive only 50% from informal 
capital, while 43% comes from non-agricultural unskilled wages. Rural agricultural 
landless workers obtain a major part of their income from agricultural wages and capital 
informal, and to some extent this group benefits from non-agricultural unskilled wages. 
The farm households source their income from labor, capital informal, land and water at 
various degrees. 
6.3. THE CGE MODEL 
Basic features of the CGE model are briefly discussed in this section, while the 
details can be found in Annexure 9. The model, called PKCGEM, is a static one-period 
                                                 
31 The SAM distinguishes 10 types of labor. There are four types of capital -- livestock, other-agriculture, 
formal and informal. Only firms receive the capital formal, while households get capital livestock, other-
agriculture and informal at various amounts. However, for purposes of our CGE model we lumped them 
together into one category, and therefore into one source of household income. There are 12 land categories 
in each of the agricultural sector. We grouped them into one category for the CGE analysis, and therefore 
one source of household income. 
32 This is the only household group receiving the dividend income. 
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model.33 It incorporates 34 production sectors, 10 labor types, capital, land, water, and 19 
household categories. Figure 3 indicates that the model specifies a transformation 
function between export (E) and domestic sales (D) using constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET). In case the export price (Pe) increases relative to the local price 
(Pl) the export supply will go up while domestic sales would decline.  
Figure 3—The basic model 
 
 
 
                   
                     (Constant elasticity of transformation, CET) 
 
 
 
 
            (Constant elasticity of substitution, CES) 
 
                              
 
Prices: 
Output price :       Px⋅X = Pe⋅E + Pl⋅D, where Pl is local prices 
Export price:        Pe = Pwe⋅er, where Pwe is world price of export and er is exchange rate 
Domestic price:    Pd = Pl⋅(1+itxr), where itxr is indirect tax rate 
Import price:        Pm = Pwm⋅er⋅ (1+ tm)⋅(1+itxr), Pwm is world price of imports and tm is tariff rate 
Composite price:  Pq⋅Q = Pd⋅D+Pm⋅M 
                                                 
33The model has a number of special features which allow one to analyze other market issues such as price 
ceiling, price floor, and buffer stock management. 
Export volume (E) 
Output 
volume (X)
Domestic sales (D) 
Import volume (M) 
Composite good (Q)
 52
Table 17—Sources of household income 
  Labor          
 Household L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 L10 K Land Wate
r 
Other
s 
h1 Large Farmers in Sindh 13.2        0.1  0.2      31.4 37.2  12.6  5.3  
h2 Large Farmers in Punjab 8.6         0.5      43.3 33.5  8.7  5.4  
h3 Large Farmers in Other Pakistan 9.8        0.0  0.1      52.4 32.3   5.4  
h4 Medium Farmers in Sindh  14.5      0.5  2.6      39.6 37.4   5.3  
h5 Medium Farmers in Punjab   10.8     0.0  4.3      52.3 27.2   5.4  
h6 Medium Farmers in Other Pakistan    14.9    1.0  1.9      38.2 38.4   5.5  
h7 Small Farmers in Sindh     6.8    4.3  4.7      57.9 20.4   5.8  
h8 Small Farmers in Punjab      7.9  4.2  10.0      51.8 20.3   5.8  
h9 Small Farmers in Other Pakistan       6.0  3.4       8.2     63.6 12.5   6.2  
h0 Small Farm Renters (landless) in Sindh     11.6    14.7       4.0     48.5 15.6   5.7  
h11 Small Farm Renters (landless) in Punjab      9.0       6.1    14.3     48.7 16.1   5.8  
h12 Small Farm Renters (landless), Other Pakistan       10.1       2.3    12.2     55.0 14.7   5.7  
h13 Rural agricultural workers (landless) in Sindh           36.0    15.1     42.8    6.2  
h14 Rural agricultural workers (landless) in Punjab           33.6    15.7     45.2    5.5  
h15 Rural agricultural workers (landless) in Other Pakistan           15.6      3.1     76.0    5.4  
h16 Rural non-farm non-poor            43.0     49.9    7.2  
h17 Rural non-farm poor            29.7     63.4    6.9  
h18 Urban non-poor            11.9 33.3    10.6    44.2  
h19 Urban Poor            76.2     18.0     5.8  
L1=labor in large farm; L2=labor in medium farm in Sindh; L3= labor in medium farm in Punjab; L4= labor in medium farm in other Pakistan; 
L5=labor in small farm in Sindh; L6= labor in small farm in Punjab; L7= labor in small farm in other Pakistan; L8=agricultural wage labor; L9=non-
agricultural wage labor (unskilled); L10= non-agricultural wage labor (skilled); K=capital 
Source: 2001-2002 Social Accounting Matrix of Pakistan. 
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 The supply side of the model assumes profit maximization. The first-order 
conditions for profit maximization generate the necessary supply and input demand 
functions. 
On the demand side, the substitution is allowed between imports and domestic 
goods using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. This substitution 
indicates product differentiation where imports and domestically produced goods are 
treated as imperfect substitutes. If the import price in local currency (Pm) declines 
relative to domestic price (Pd), the demand for imports will rise while the demand for 
local goods would decline. The demand side assumes cost minimization and the first-
order conditions generate the import and domestic demand functions. The trade 
elasticities in the CES and CET functions are presented in Table 15.34 
The pricing mechanism operates as follows. The output price (Px) is composite 
price of export (Pe) and local (Pl) prices. Indirect taxes are added to the local price to 
determine the domestic price (Pd), which together with import price (Pm) will determine 
the composite commodity price (Pq). The composite price (Pc), which incorporates 
consumption tax or subsidy, is the price paid by the consumers. The import price (Pm) is 
denominated in domestic currency, and is affected by the world price of imports, the 
exchange rate (er), the tariff rate (tm), and the indirect tax rate (itx). The direct effect of a 
                                                 
34The elasticities used in our analysis are half the level of the recently estimated parameters of the GTAP 
model (Hertel et al 2004). The trade elasticity parameters used for irrigated and non-irrigated wheat, and 
wheat milling is 1.1, which is much lower than the GTAP elasticity of 4.5. Two sensitivity analyses are 
conducted using elasticity parameters values of 2.2 and 0.8 for these sectors.  
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tariff reduction is a reduction in Pm -- if large enough will reduce the composite price 
(Pq). 
The households are assumed to maximize their utility based on Cobb-Douglas 
(CD) functional form. The intermediate demand is determined by a set of fixed Leontief 
coefficients. Sectoral capital is fixed and labor supply is also fixed.  
The macroeconomic closure used in the model is as follows: 
Total (E−M) = Total (S−I) + Total (Tx−G) 
where E is total exports of goods and services, M is total imports of goods and services, S 
is total private savings, I is total private investment, Tx is total government income and G 
is total government expenditure. The left side of the above equation indicates total 
external balance and is assumed fixed. This is equivalent to assuming constant foreign 
savings. The nominal exchange rate is the numéraire. The foreign trade sector is 
effectively cleared by changes in the real exchange rate, which is the ratio of the nominal 
exchange rate multiplied by the world prices and divided by the domestic price index. 
The S−I, the first part on the right hand side of the equation, represents the private sector 
balance and is solved in the model. Savings of firms are fixed, while dividend income is 
endogenous35. The second term (Tx-G) on the right hand side of the equation represents 
the total government balance: government income and expenditure are assumed fixed. A 
                                                 
35The rationale for fixing savings of firms and endogenizing dividend income is to capture the impact of 
changes in pricing policies on the income of the owners of firms. In the 2001-02 SAM, the entire dividend 
income of firms goes to urban non-poor households only, which implies that this group owns the firms. 
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compensatory indirect tax is introduced to offset whatever loss/gain in revenue is 
incurred during the implementation of the policy experiments.   
6.3.1  Policy Experiments 
In computing the base run we recalibrated the model to capture the following 
features: 
a) Wheat import is 10% of total supply. In the 2001-02 SAM wheat imports is only 
2.5% of supply. Thus this adjustment recalibrates the model to the structure in the 
1990s. 
b) Increase world price for wheat so that when we impose production tax and 
consumption subsidy import prices will be higher than the producer prices after 
tax (23% higher) and consumer prices after subsidy (22% higher). These taxes 
and subsidies have been mentioned in Section 6.1. 
c) Imported and domestically produced wheat are perfect substitutes. 
We analyze the two price distortions in wheat economy in a two-step simulation 
procedure.36 The first step involves consumption subsidy only, while the second step 
deals with production tax only. The total effect is the sum of the results from each of 
these two steps. The rationale for this two-step procedure is given in Figures 4 and 5. 
Figure 4 shows the analysis of subsidy. Point A is the equilibrium distorted by 
consumption subsidy. The price at q0 is Ps where the consumer enjoys a subsidy of AB. If 
                                                 
36Furthermore, imports of wheat are fixed. Also, there is no cost minimization condition in wheat demand.  
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the subsidy is eliminated, q0 may be unaffordable for the consumer. At P0 the consumer 
will only be able to buy q1 where the new equilibrium is at point D. The elimination of 
subsidy effectively shifts the demand curve to DD1 and the supply curve to SS1. The shift 
in the supply curve would actually cause shift in resource away from wheat sector to 
other sectors because of reduced demand. The elimination of subsidy reduces consumer 
welfare equal to the area of the triangle ABD. 
 The analysis of production is presented in Figure 5. The usual application of a 
production tax shifts quantity from q0 to q1 where consumer faces a higher price at Pc 
while producer receives a lower price at Px. The government generates production tax of 
CB per unit of q. The elimination of production tax will generate two effects: an increase 
in producer surplus equal to the area P0PxBA; and an increase in consumer surplus equal 
to P0PcCA. If accommodated in the CGE model as such, it will overestimate the effects. 
Since the change in consumer surplus is analyzed in the first step (Figure 4), we are 
interested to capture the change in producer surplus only. In order to achieve this 
objective we introduce an adjustment factor so that Pc remains equal to P0. 
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Figure 4—Analysis of subsidy 
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Figure 5—Analysis of subsidy 
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 We compare the results of the consumption subsidy and production tax analyses 
with the solution of the model where the wheat market is free from these distortions. Free 
market is characterized as follows: wheat imports are not fixed, but perfect substitutes for 
domestic wheat; and zero consumption subsidy and production tax.  
6.3.2  Simulation Results 
 Table 18 shows the results for wheat assuming free market, consumption subsidy 
of 22% and production tax of 23%.  
The consumption subsidy of 22% lowers the consumer price by 28.7% relative to 
the free market price. It also lowers the consumer price and import price ratio to 0.78. 
The amount of subsidy is about 29.4 billion rupees. Since there is no production tax in the 
present simulation, the ratio of output price after tax and import price is practically the 
same as in the free market.  
Thus, if consumption price subsidy on wheat is eliminated its consumer price 
increases by 28.7%, which in turn reduces total wheat demand by -3.8%. Wheat import 
declines by 1.5%, which is largely due to the freeing of wheat importation. Consumer 
demands for domestically produced wheat declines by 4%. On the other hand, overall 
production of wheat declines by 4.1% and wheat export declines by 4.9%. The latter 
would have only small impact because of minor share in total production (Table 15). 
These results are consistent with the theoretical insights derived from Figure 4 where the 
movement from Point A -- distorted by consumption subsidy, to Point B -- free from 
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distortion, lowers quantity demand to q1. This movement results in loss of consumer 
welfare. 
The production tax analysis is also presented in Table 18. We applied an 
adjustment factor of 0.173 on consumer price so that the consumer price with or without 
production tax remains the same as explained earlier. The production tax of 23 percent 
lowers the output price by 30.3%. Thus, the elimination of production tax the output price 
would increase by 30.3%, which in turn will lower the cost of production by 18.9%. 
Overall production will increase by 1.3%. Output sold to the domestic market will 
increase by 0.3%, while exports will increase by 58.9%. The increase in exports is largely 
due to improved price competitiveness of wheat as a result of lower cost of production. 
These set of results are consistent with the theoretical insights derived in Figure 5.  
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Table 18—Free market versus distorted market for wheat  
    Distorted Market 
    With Subsidy With Production Tax 
Wheat grain Free market Levels % Change* Levels % Change* 
Prices:           
Consumer price 1.08 0.84 28.7 1.08   
Consumption subsidy 0.00 0.22   0.17**   
Amount of subsidy (bil rupees)** 0.00 29.43       
Import Price 1.08 1.08   1.08   
Domestic Price 1.08 1.08   1.33 -18.9 
Output Price 1.00 0.99   1.00   
Output tax 0.00 0.00   0.23   
Output Price after tax 1.00 0.99   0.77 30.3 
Price ratios:           
Consumer price ÷ Import price 1.00 0.78   1.00   
Output price after tax ÷ Output price 1.00 1.00   0.77   
Output price after tax ÷ Import price 0.92 0.92   0.71   
Quantities:            
Total demand 1.19 1.24 -3.8 1.19 0.1 
From imports 0.12 0.12 -1.5 0.12 -1.5 
From domestic supply 1.07 1.12 -4.0 1.07 0.3 
Total production 1.20 1.25 -4.1 1.18 1.3 
To domestic market 1.07 1.12 -4.0 1.07 0.3 
To export market 0.04 0.04 -4.9 0.02 58.9 
*Market reform relative to free market.  
**Subsidy financed by all sectors because government income is fixed by assumption 
***Adjustment factor 
  
 Before discussing the effects on factor prices, household income and welfare, we 
highlight the impact on wheat milling and livestock sectors, both are closely linked to 
wheat production37. Table 19 shows that the elimination of consumption subsidy would 
have larger impact on wheat milling than on livestock, which is consistent with the 
structure shown in Table 14. The elimination of production tax has significantly lower 
                                                 
37Detailed sectoral results concerning the elimination of price subsidy on wheat, which we will not discuss 
in full length, are presented in Annexure Table 8, while detailed results of eliminating production tax on 
wheat are in Annexure Table 9. Results in Table 19 were drawn from these tables. 
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impact on wheat milling and livestock sectors relative to the dismantling of consumption 
subsidy.  
Table 19— Impact of wheat market reform on flour and livestock 
  % Change* 
  With  With production 
  Subsidy Tax 
Wheat flour     
Prices:     
Consumer price 4.88 0.05 
Import price -0.39 0.00 
Domestic price 5.12 5.93 
Output price 5.43 0.06 
Quantities:      
Total demand -4.62 0.04 
From imports 6.83 0.17 
From domestic supply -5.10 0.03 
Total production -5.32 0.03 
To domestic market -5.10 0.03 
To export market -15.60 0.03 
Livestock     
Prices:     
Consumer price 0.00 0.10 
Import price -0.39 0.00 
Domestic price 0.00 0.09 
Output price 0.39 0.10 
Quantities:      
Total demand -0.12 0.01 
From imports 0.66 0.20 
From domestic supply -0.13 0.00 
Total production -0.13 0.00 
To domestic market -0.13 0.00 
To export market -2.12 -1.33 
Market reform relative to free market 
  
 The impact on factor prices is presented in Table 20. Farm and agricultural wages 
decline if consumption subsidy is eliminated. The decline is due to the reduction in 
output because of lower demand for wheat. However, non-agricultural wages -- both 
skilled and unskilled improve. These results clearly indicate that the elimination of wheat 
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consumption subsidy, some of the resources devoted to wheat production will relocate to 
other sectors of the economy -- non-agriculture as well as agriculture.  
Table 20— Impact of wheat market reform on factor prices 
  % Change* 
  With  With production 
  Subsidy Tax 
Wage, own farm labor, large farm -1.60 0.45 
Wage, own farm labor, medium farm, Sindh -1.11 0.33 
Wage, own farm labor, medium farm, Punjab -0.94 0.30 
Wage, own farm labor, medium farm, Other Pakistan -3.33 0.96 
Wage, own farm labor, small farm, Sindh -1.15 0.37 
Wage, own farm labor, small farm, Punjab -1.36 0.45 
Wage, own farm labor, small farm, Other Pakistan -1.04 0.29 
Agricultural wage -1.11 0.21 
Non-agricultural wage unskilled 0.20 0.09 
Non-agricultural wage skilled 0.32 0.04 
Average return to capital -0.28 0.08 
Return to land -0.03 0.11 
Return to water -4.11 0.40 
*Market reform relative to free market 
 
Wheat production uses significant amount of irrigation water followed by fruits 
and vegetables. The reduction in wheat production will lower the return to water. The 
return to land increases indicating re-allocation of land use from wheat production to 
other agricultural crops and other agricultural sub-sectors. 
 The effects on household income, consumer prices, and welfare have also been 
analyzed and are presented in Table 21. The effect of elimination of wheat consumption 
subsidy on income is generally negative on agricultural and rural households. This is 
largely due to the reduction in wheat output, which in turn reallocates resources from 
wheat production to other sectors. Thus, prices of factors heavily used in wheat 
production decline.  
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Consumer prices generally increase as a result of the elimination of consumption 
subsidy. The consumption-weighted consumer prices are shown in Column 2 in Table 21. 
The results show that the weighted consumer price does not increase for all households. 
Rather, four household groups face lower consumer prices including large farmers in 
Punjab (h2), medium farmers in Punjab (h5), rural non-farm non-poor (h16), and urban 
non-poor (h18). This is due to the fact that these households have relatively low share of 
wheat consumption in their consumption basket. The decline in weighted consumer 
prices for these groups indicates that the prices of other items in their consumption basket 
decline at a much higher rate than the increase in the price of wheat. The reduction in 
prices is due mainly to the increase in production of other sectors as a result of resource 
diversion away from wheat. The households that face rising weighted consumer price 
have much higher wheat consumption share in their consumption basket as indicated in 
Table 16.  
As discussed earlier the elimination of consumption subsidy would entail a 
reduction in consumer surplus. Our results indicate that the overall reduction in consumer 
welfare as measured by EV38 amounts to -2.889 billion rupees, or -0.08% of the total 
household income. With the exception of urban non-poor, all household groups suffer 
from a reduction in consumer welfare but in varying amounts. The highest reduction (-
0.99%) in welfare relative to income is observed for the large farmers in Sindh (h1). The 
reduction in welfare is dominated by the income effects over the price effects. This is 
                                                 
38 See Annexure 9 for the derivation of the EV used in the analysis. 
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followed by rural agricultural landless workers in Sindh (h13) and large farmers in 
Punjab (h2) with welfare reduction 0.71% and 0.64% relative to their income, 
respectively. For group h2 the welfare reduction is due to the negative income effects, 
and for h13 decline in welfare results both from negative income effect and the increase 
in average consumer price -- reinforcing one another. 
The urban non-poor (h18) household group experiences a net welfare gain 
amounting 1.592 billion rupees, or 0.09% of its income. The net gain in welfare effect 
comes largely from the reduction in its consumption-weighted average consumer price as 
shown in Table 21 since there appears to have no income effect. The net effect comes 
from two offsetting effects: the positive effect on labor income and the negative effect on 
dividend income. Table 17 indicated that this group sourced 11.9% and 33.3% of its 
income from unskilled and skilled non-agricultural labor. Since non-agricultural wages 
increase for both levels of skills (Table 20), therefore the group’s labor income improves. 
However, the dividend income drops for this group since the elimination of consumption 
subsidy in the analysis is applied to the user price of wheat. When consumption subsidy 
is eliminated the wheat millers -- the main wheat users as processor, have to pay a higher 
price. That in turn reduces their profits. Since savings of firms is held fixed by 
assumption in the simulation, this implies reduction in dividend income. The dividend 
income entirely goes to the urban non-poor resulting into decline in their income.
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Table 21—Household welfare effects of market reform on wheat  
  Free Market and With Subsidy Free Market and With Production Tax Combined Effects 
  % change* Eqiuvalent   % change* Eqiuvalent   Eqiuvalent   
  income Weighted Variation, EV EV % of income Weighted Variation, EV EV % of Variation, EV EV % of 
    Consumer Price (mil rupees) income   Consumer Price (mil rupees) income (mil rupees) income 
Households 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (3+7) (4+8) 
Large Farmers in Sindh -0.94 0.02 -188 -0.99 0.28 0.07 37 0.20 -151 -0.79 
Large Farmers in Punjab -0.72 -0.08 -410 -0.64 0.21 0.07 94 0.15 -316 -0.49 
Large Farmersin Other Pakistan -0.33 0.03 -39 -0.36 0.14 0.06 10 0.09 -29 -0.27 
Medium Farmers in Sindh -0.30 0.02 -143 -0.32 0.15 0.07 42 0.09 -101 -0.23 
Medium Farmers in Punjab -0.25 -0.08 -251 -0.17 0.14 0.07 102 0.07 -149 -0.10 
Medium Farmers in Other Pakistan -0.64 0.03 -242 -0.68 0.25 0.06 68 0.19 -174 -0.49 
Small Farmers in Sindh -0.28 0.00 -172 -0.30 0.13 0.07 33 0.06 -139 -0.24 
Small Farmers in Punjab -0.29 0.02 -998 -0.32 0.14 0.07 210 0.07 -788 -0.25 
Small Farmers in Other Pakistan -0.26 0.05 -399 -0.32 0.11 0.07 47 0.04 -352 -0.28 
Small Farm Renters (landless) in Sindh -0.44 0.08 -224 -0.51 0.14 0.07 33 0.08 -191 -0.44 
Small Farm Renters (landless) in Punjab -0.30 0.07 -173 -0.38 0.15 0.07 31 0.07 -142 -0.31 
Small Farm Renters (landeless) in Other Pakistan -0.26 0.07 -52 -0.35 0.13 0.07 7 0.05 -45 -0.30 
Rural agricultural workers (landless) in Sindh -0.46 0.21 -146 -0.71 0.15 0.07 10 0.05 -136 -0.66 
Rural agricultural workers (landless) in Punjab -0.47 0.14 -417 -0.62 0.12 0.07 32 0.05 -385 -0.57 
Rural agricultural workers (landess) in Other Pakistan -0.34 0.23 -59 -0.62 0.14 0.07 2 0.02 -57 -0.60 
Rural non-farm, non-poor -0.05 -0.02 -131 -0.03 0.08 0.07 43 0.01 -88 -0.02 
Rural non-farm poor -0.11 0.17 -394 -0.30 0.08 0.07 9 0.01 -385 -0.29 
Urban non-poor -0.02 -0.11 1,592 0.09 0.07 0.07 27 0.00 1,619 0.09 
Urban Poor 0.10 0.12 -43 -0.02 0.08 0.07 26 0.01 -17 -0.01 
Total     -2,889 -0.08     863 0.03 -2,026 -0.06 
*Market reform relative to free market  
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The impact of reduction in production tax is positive on all household groups. The 
increase in consumption-weighted consumer prices in all household groups is too small to 
have any significant impact on changing the welfare of the households. However, all 
household groups enjoy a positive increase in welfare arising from the increase in 
producer surplus. In monetary terms, the overall increase in welfare amounts to 0.86 
billion rupees, or 0.03% of total household income. 
The positive producer surplus arising from the elimination of production tax is not 
significant enough to offset the loss in consumer surplus resulting from the elimination of 
consumption subsidy. With the exception of urban households, all household groups 
experience net loss in welfare. The urban non-poor households gain about 1.62 billion 
rupees in welfare (i.e., 0.09% of income). The overall net welfare loss is 2.03 billion 
rupees, or 0.06% of total income. 
7. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The economy of Pakistan is dominated by the agriculture and thus the livelihood 
of majority of the people depends on the farm income. This sector directly employs 
nearly 42%of the country’s total labor force. The export earnings in Pakistan are largely 
based on the surplus generated in the agriculture sector. The performance of this sector 
over the last four decades remained quite satisfactory with an average growth rate of 
3.4% per annum higher than the population growth rate in the country. Still the country is 
far behind in its efforts to provide an acceptable level of dietary requirement to its people 
even at the aggregate level and the daily average availability of calories per person in the 
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country is lower by about 10 and 26% than that available respectively in other developing 
and developed nations. 
The change in diet composition overtime shows a squeezing share of wheat 
(cereals as well) while share of intake from animal origin increased in total calories 
consumed. However, wheat remained the dominant source of calories and thus plays a 
vital role in food security and human diet in the country. Despite the fact that the daily 
average availability of calories per person from all sources in the country was 
considerably lower during the 1970s and the 1980s than its availability during the 1990s, 
the incidence of poverty has also been lower during the decades of 70s and 80s. It 
highlights that enhanced food availability at the national level does not necessarily 
indicate actual increased food consumption at regional or household level and/or every 
individual has an improved access to food in the country. Regardless of the reasonable 
rate of growth in agriculture sector, caloric based poverty increased during the 1990s 
highlighting the fact that factors determining the poverty other than the national income 
growth have been much stronger in pushing greater proportion of people below the 
poverty line. The major reasons could be the worsening income and landholdings 
inequality. Moreover, disparities in access to education and health may also be crucial 
factors leading to wide spread income inequalities. Further to note is the fact that despite 
significant improvement in food supply in the aggregate, malnutrition is a widespread 
phenomenon in Pakistan. 
Food and agricultural prices are the major determinants of producers’ incentives 
as well as real income in developing countries. In this vein, the government of Pakistan 
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had been pursuing interventionist policies quite actively in agricultural inputs as well as 
outputs markets to ensure food security. Most of these interventions have now been 
abolished. However, some market distortions through interventions in fixing agricultural 
prices and involvement of the state owned enterprises in trading still continue. 
Particularly, wheat marketing remained mainly in the public sector. Thus the creation of 
distortion free and a competitive private food marketing system remains to be dreamed 
of.  
As regards trade policy, the government of Pakistan has also been pursuing the 
objective of a greater openness through liberalization with minimal tariff and non-tariff 
barriers and the market-based exchange rate system. The difference between the official 
exchange rate and in the open market has reached at a negligible level of 1.45% in 2000-
01. The custom tariff, the average applied rate, fell from 56% in 1993-94 to 20.4% in 
2000-01. The maximum rate of custom duty has been reduced to 25% in 2002 from 70% 
in 1995, and the government has completely dismantled the quantitative restrictions. 
Furthermore, Pakistan has removed all textile products from its negative list despite the 
fact that many of them are the key export products. However, the imports and exports of 
wheat and wheat flour are to a large extent the government of Pakistan and the domestic 
wheat marketing is also mainly controlled by the government. 
The comparison between domestic prices with the parity prices for different crops 
shows that basmati rice growers are the most adversely affected by the policy 
disincentives followed by the wheat growers. However, IRRI rice and cotton growers are 
relatively better off followed by sugarcane growers. These interventions have been 
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resulting into immense resource transfer from agriculture to non-agriculture sectors. The 
major beneficiary appeared to have been the processors and the consumers at the expense 
of producers and the government exchequer. 
The comparison of the incidentals of government-owned departments with that of 
the private traders shows that the private sector incidentals are relatively lower than those 
for the state-owned enterprises. In addition to cost difference, the corruption is pervasive 
in commodity marketing particularly in public sector. The rent seeking activities increase 
transaction costs and uncertainty, discourage marketing investment and participation, and 
ultimately lead to a negative fiscal impact for the government. 
The results of CGE model indicate that the reduction in consumption subsidy on 
wheat increases the user price as well as the consumer price of wheat. This lowers the 
overall wheat demand. The reduction in demand reduces wheat production and moves 
resources out of this sector. The reduction in wheat production will result in lower prices 
of factors being heavily used in wheat sector. Since wheat is a major agricultural crop, 
agricultural wages will also drop. This effect will translate into lower labor income for 
households dependent on agriculture. The experiments indicate that the increase in 
consumer prices and the drop in income as a result of the elimination of consumption 
subsidy will generate a total net welfare loss of 2.961 billion rupees, representing about 
0.09% of total household income.  
Because of the variations in the sources of income as well as in the composition 
of consumption baskets of various household groups, the income and the consumer price 
effects vary across the groups. Some groups have larger negative income effects than 
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price effects, while some groups experience reinforcing negative income and price 
effects. However, the results indicate that urban non-poor benefits from the decline in its 
consumption-weighted consumer price. The decline is due to two factors: the relatively 
low share of wheat in its consumption basket; and the downward pressure on prices of 
other items in its consumption basket as a result of resource re-allocation from wheat 
production to other production sectors.  This group experiences higher welfare gain of 
1.973 billion rupees, or 0.11% of its income. 
On the other hand, the elimination of production tax will benefit all household 
groups because of higher wheat production. The total net welfare gain is about 1 billion 
rupees. However, the positive producer surplus effects arising from the elimination of 
production tax is not significant enough to offset the loss in consumer surplus resulting 
from the elimination of consumption subsidy. Thus, the overall welfare effect is a net loss 
of 1.885 billion rupees, or 0.05% of household income. 
In a nutshell, eliminating the government interventions the results of the CGE 
model lead us to draw four major conclusions: 1) price of wheat would turn out to be too 
high to be affordable to the consumers;39 2) Production may not increase much to 
compensate to bring the consumer prices down; 3) The loss in consumer surplus will be 
more than the producer gain; and 4) All household groups will face lower welfare except 
the urban non-poor: The latter may look for cheaper food substitutes. 
                                                 
39 Some other empirical studies reviewed in this study also show that free market equilibrium price would 
too high to be affordable by the poor. 
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Moreover, our simplified, partial equilibrium analysis in Section 6.1 has also 
shown that the gain by removing production taxes would not compensate for loss in 
consumer welfare by eliminating consumer subsidies. However, the government 
expenditures going into the wheat procurement and distribution system – being just 
transferred to millers, can be saved. 
The reader should note that these simulation results were generated using a static 
one-period CGE model. The dynamic long-run effects of higher incentives for wheat 
farmers as a result of the elimination of the implicit production tax (which may result in 
higher investment in medium to long run) are not considered. This effect could be larger. 
The dramatic increase in export volume as a result of the elimination of the implicit 
production tax because of the price competitiveness effect could be a source of larger 
dynamic effects in medium to long run. 
Based on these results and conclusions, what option do we have in wheat 
marketing? The existing system of procurement and distribution enforced through 
movement restrictions on wheat grains creates also disincentives for the private sector to 
invest in wheat trade. However, it may not be advisable to leave the wheat economy fully 
at the behest of the markets owing to the importance of wheat in household consumption 
and production. 
So what is the solution? The government should slowly step out of the food 
market and let the market function freely. However, to avoid extreme fluctuations in food 
prices the government needs to monitor wheat production and availability in the country. 
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The government has to maintain a buffer stock of optimal size for wheat purchased from 
the domestic market or through imports – interventions be based on market prices. 
 The government must develop food insecurity maps and target the extremely and 
moderately food insecure regions through food stamps. The huge sum of subsidies 
afforded by the government can be redirected to developing physical infrastructure and 
agricultural research aimed at high yielding varieties of crops resistant to biotic and 
abiotic stresses and with higher nutritional value may prove cheaper and more affective 
option to ensure food security. 
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ANNEXURES 
Annexure Table 1—Area, yield, and production of food grains and pulses in 
                                   Pakistan 
Year Wheat Rice Maize Other 
Cereals 
All 
Cereals 
Other 
Pulses 
Gram 
Area (000 hectares) 
1959-60 4878 1204 482 1479 8043 555 1142 
1969-70 6229 1622 648 1279 9778 411 928 
1979-80 6924 2035 701 1144 10803 422 1129 
1989-90 7845 2107 863 1108 11922 461 1035 
1999-00 8463 2515 962 794 12734 447 972 
2000-01 8180 2376 944 859 12359 424 905 
2001-02 8057 2114 942 886 11999 446 934 
2002-03 8033 2225 936 798 11992 461 963 
2003-04 8216 2461 947 1033 12657 474 982 
Yield (kg/hectare) 
1959-60 801 826 911 396 737 409 532 
1969-70 1171 1480 1031 539 1130 483 545 
1979-80 1568 1581 1248 563 1443 469 278 
1989-90 1825 1528 1366 538 1620 448 543 
1999-00 2491 2050 1717 622 2229 532 581 
2000-01 2325 2021 1740 601 2103 529 439 
2001-02 2262 1836 1766 607 2026 520 388 
2002-03 2388 2013 1856 605 2159 553 701 
        
Production (000 tonnes) 
1959-60 3909 995 439 586 5929 295 608 
1969-70 7294 2401 668 690 11053 471 506 
1979-80 10857 3216 875 644 15592 625 313 
1989-90 14316 3220 1179 596 19311 557 562 
1999-00 21079 5156 1652 494 28381 827 565 
2000-01 19019 4802 1643 516 25986 757 397 
2001-02 18225 3881 1664 538 24310 609 362 
2002-03 19183 4479 1737 483 25891 713 675 
200304 19500 4848 1897 630 26875  611 
Pakistan (2004 and previous issues). 
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Annexure Table 2—Farm Classification by Farm Size 
 Numbers Farms% Farm Area% 
 1960  1972  1980  1990 2000  1960  1972 1980 1990 2000  
< 5 19.0 28.2 34.1 47.5 57.6 3.0 5.2 7.1 11.3 15.5 
5 to < 12.5 44.3 39.9 39.4 33.4 28.1 23.6 25.2 27.3 27.5 27.9 
12.5 to < 25 23.8 21.1 17.3 12.2 8.8 27.0 26.6 24.7 21.5 19.1 
25 to < 50 9.0 7.7 6.5 4.7 3.9 19.0 18.8 17.8 15.8 16.3 
50 to < 150 3.3 2.7 2.4 1.8 1.2 16.0 15.1 14.7 13.9 9.6 
> 150 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 11.5 9.1 8.5 10.1 11.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: Malik (2003). 
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Annexure Table 3—Exchange rates: Official and open market 
Year Official Rate Market Rate Overvaluation (%) 
1960-61 4.76 7.45 56.45 
1964-65 4.76 7.72 62.12 
1969-70 4.76 7.87 65.27 
1974-75 9.90 13.53 36.67 
1979-80 9.90 13.17 33.03 
1984-85 15.15 19.20 26.73 
1989-90 21.45   
1990-91 22.42 23.27 3.79 
1991-92 24.84 24.86 0.08 
1992-93 25.96 27.56 6.16 
1993-94 30.16 30.44 0.93 
1994-95 30.85 31.69 2.72 
1995-96 33.57 35.35 5.30 
1996-97 38.99 41.03 5.23 
1997-98 43.20 44.83 3.77 
1998-99 50.05 54.25 8.39 
1999-00 51.77 54.23 4.75 
2000-01 58.44 61.25 4.81 
2001-02 61.43 62.32 1.45 
2003-4 57.55 57.84 0.51 
2004-05 59.42 59.63 0.35 
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Annexure Table 4—Consumption of electricity in Pakistan and its provinces (Gwh) 
Year Pakistan Punjab Sindh NWFPP Baluch 
1960 67    
1965 424    
1970 956 859 40.46 46.59 10.24
1975 1531 1311 117.19 82.94 19.77
1980 2056 1688 180.96 105.08 83.62
1985 2782 2068 308.82 148.57 257.43
1990 5004 3447 554.52 365.2 637.44
1991 5595 3867 631.93 372.09 724.72
1992 5823 4132 635.98 253.23 800.94
1993 5595 3972 598.55 228.69 795.79
1994 5742 4031 687.8 231.21 792.54
1995 6220 4240 681.98 375.08 922.9
1996 6658 4417 730.88 495.55 1014.03
1997 7019 4537 833 585 1063
1998 6956 4280 894.05 546.08 1167.64
1999 5576 3344 736.19 363.61 1131.59
2000 4512 2381 557.34 327.56 1245.68
2001 4896 2370 635.58 329.37 1560.89
2002 5581 2551 646.84 391.81 1991.93
Source: WAPDA (2003). 
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Annexure Table 5—Terms of Trade in Agriculture 
Terms of Trade Period Index of 
Producer 
Prices 
(PPI)a 
Index of 
Consumer 
Prices 
(CPI)b 
Index of 
International 
Producer 
Prices 
(IPP)c 
Index of 
Input 
Prices 
(IPI)d 
TOTCPI 
= 
PPI/CPI 
TOTIPP 
= 
PPI/IPP 
TOTIPI 
= 
PPI/IPI 
1983-84 100 100 100 100 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1984-85 102.73 105.67 104.43 113.2 97.22 98.37 90.75 
1985-86 104.35 110.27 97.48 111.61 94.63 107.05 93.50 
1986-87 107.29 114.24 90.35 115.77 93.92 118.75 92.68 
1987-88 117.17 121.43 101.97 123.74 96.49 114.91 94.69 
1988-89 129.05 134.04 129.42 132.52 96.28 99.71 97.38 
1989-90 131.22 142.14 164.38 152.64 92.32 79.83 85.97 
1990-91 147.47 160.13 168.68 172.57 92.09 87.43 85.46 
1991-92 166.99 175.53 169.15 174.06 95.13 98.72 95.94 
199293 180.16 191.78 179.2 182.43 93.94 100.54 98.76 
199394 210.89 213.21 195.42 218.14 98.91 107.92 96.68 
1994-95 230.37 240.76 235.46 248.35 95.68 97.84 92.76 
1995-96 245.9 266.76 292.85 249.59 92.18 83.97 98.52 
1996-97 290.65 298.23 357.54 294.88 97.46 81.29 98.57 
1997-98 323.83 321.54 327.07 310.9 100.71 99.01 104.16 
1998-99 353.37 339.96 325.48 333.32 103.94 108.57 106.02 
1999-00 355.74 352.17 315.5 340.02 101.01 112.75 104.62 
2000-01 355.22 367.68 342.54 358.04 96.61 103.70 99.21 
2001-02 369.76 380.7 382.56 385.79 97.13 96.65 95.84 
2002-03 390.96 392.5 377.81 410.93 99.61 103.48 95.14 
Source: Khan and Ahmed (2005) 
Note: a) Included commodities are wheat, rice, maize, bajra, jowar, barley, sugarcane, cotton, gram, moong,   
             mash, masoor, onion, potato, tomato, mango, banana, apple, guava and citrus: Annual wholesale  
             prices were used; c) rice, wheat, cotton, jowar, citrus fruits, banana, barley, and maize; d)  Inputs  
             include fertilizer, diesel oil, water, and pesticides. 
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Annexure Table 6—Producer tax and consumer subsidy 
 Years 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 Average 
 Quantities million tones      
A Total production 16.70 18.70 17.90 21.10 18.60 
B Farm home consumption 35% of A 5.85 6.55 6.27 7.39 6.51 
C Feed Seed and wastage (10% of A) 1.67 1.87 1.79 2.11 1.86 
D Sold to government (procurement)  2.70 4.00 4.10 8.60 4.85 
E Sold in open market  (A-B-C-D) 6.49 6.29 5.75 3.01 5.38 
F Imports 2.38 4.11 2.33 2.35 2.79 
G Consumption purchased from the market (E+F)  8.87 10.39 8.08 5.36 8.17 
H Total available for consumption (=A-C+F) 17.41 20.94 18.44 21.34 19.53 
 Prices/costs      
I Govt. storage cost Rs/tone 1069 1399 1609 1694 1443 
J Private storage cost (90% of I) 962 1259 1448 1525 1299 
K Support Price Rs/tone (sold at procurement 
centers) 
6000 6000 6000 7500 6375 
L Issue price Rs/tone  4850 6500 6500 8000 6463 
M Wholesale price in Lahore 5475 7415 7225 7102 6804 
O Import Parity in Lahore 8950 9100 7875 9225 8788 
Q Government adjusted price -- includes storage cost 
(=K+I) 
7069 7399 7609 9194 7818 
R Government price of imported wheat       
 includes 6 months of govt. storage cost (=O+I/2) 9484 9800 8680 10072 9509 
 Values      
 Farmers      
S Value of farm home consumption(=B*m) 32001 48528 45265 52449 44561 
X Value of output sold in market (E*m) 35505 46601 41508 21342 36239 
Y Value of output sold to the government (D*K) 16200 24000 24600 64500 32325 
Z Value of output kept for feed, seed or wasted 
(=C*M) 
9143 13865 12933 14985 12732 
AA Total Value of output at domestic prices 
(=S+X+Y+Z) 
92850 132994 124305 153276 125856 
AB Total value of output at international prices 
(=A*O) 
149465 170170 140963 194648 163811 
 Government      
AC Cost of govt. procured wheat including 
storage:(=Q*D) 
19085 29598 31199 79071 39738 
AD Cost of imported wheat: (R*F) 22601 40267 20258 23690 26704 
AE Govt. total cost on imported and domestic 
procurement: AD+AC 
41686 69865 51457 102761 66442 
AF Government recovery- sold to millers: (D+F)*L 24653 52709 41821 87616 51700 
AG Government subsidy involved: (AE-AF) 17034 17156 9636 15145 14743 
 Consumer      
AH Value of consumed commodity at wholesale price: 
M*H 
95336 155254 133258 151573 133855 
AM Value of consumed commodity at international 
price: H*O 
155846 190545 145247 196880 172129 
 Millers      
AN Rent to the millers (=Q-L) 2219 899 1109 1194 1355 
AO Millers profit (=M-L) 625 915 725 -898 342 
AP Millers per unit gain  2844 1814 1834 296 1697 
AQ Millers total gain (D+F)*AP 14454 14710 11803 3246 11053 
 Welfare gains      
AR Consumer gain: AM-AH  60510 35291 11989 45307 38274 
AS Millers gain 14454 14710 11803 3246 11053 
AT Producer loss (AB-AA) 56615 37176 16658 41371 37955 
AU Government cost involved: (=AG) 17034 17156 9636 15145 14743 
AV Gain to the society 1315 -4331 -2502 -7963 -3370 
Source: Pakistan (various issues) and Slam (2003)  
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Annexure Table 7—Detailed sectoral effects of elimination of subsidy on wheat, % 
  Changes in Price Changes in Volume 
  px pl pva pc pq pd pm pe x d q m e 
Wheat irrigated 0.33 0.35 -1.41 28.66 0.36 0.39 0.04 -4.87 -4.07 -4.05 -3.80 -1.51 -4.87 
Wheat non-irrigated -0.47 -0.47 -0.49 -0.86 -0.86 -0.86    -3.78 -3.78 -3.78    
Paddy IRRI -0.40 -0.40 -0.38 -0.79 -0.79 -0.79    0.15 0.15 0.15    
Paddy basmati -0.59 -0.59 -0.69 -0.98 -0.98 -0.98    0.31 0.31 0.31    
Cotton -0.42 -0.42 -0.41 -0.80 -0.80 -0.80    0.45 0.45 0.45    
Sugarcane -0.45 -0.45 -0.39 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83    0.22 0.22 0.22    
Other major crops -0.32 -0.34 -0.26 -0.71 -0.71 -0.72 -0.39 0.67 -0.47 -0.50 -0.55 -1.53 0.67 
Fruits & vegetables -0.39 -0.41 -0.39 -0.76 -0.76 -0.80 -0.39 1.41 0.71 0.69 0.62 -0.10 1.41 
Livestock, cattle, dairy 0.39 0.39 -1.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.39 -2.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 0.66 -2.12 
Poultry 0.42 0.42 -0.98 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 -5.66 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 0.00 -5.66 
Forestry -0.07 -0.11 0.00 -0.47 -0.47 -0.49 -0.39 0.49 0.25 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.49 
Agriculture 0.09 0.09 -0.77 2.21 -0.26 -0.27 -0.01 -0.01 -0.28 -0.22 -0.08 -0.28 -0.32 
Fishing Industry 0.09 0.11 0.38 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 0.49 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.16 25.00 0.06 
Mining 0.06 0.08 0.21 -0.38 -0.38 -0.32 0.25 -0.17 0.06 0.10 0.26 0.29 -0.17 
Vegetable oil -0.13 -0.13 2.69 -0.49 -0.49 -0.53 3.08 -13.04 0.38 0.38 0.27 -0.07 -13.04 
Wheat milling 5.43 5.53 -21.37 4.88 4.88 5.12 -25.54 -15.60 -5.32 -5.10 -4.62 6.83 -15.60 
Rice milling IRRI -0.02 -0.05 1.30 -0.44 -0.44 -0.44 1.63 0.43 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.43 
Rice milling Basmati -0.06 -0.09 1.60 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 2.01 0.56 0.40 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.56 
Sugar -0.06 -0.06 1.03 -0.46 -0.46 -0.45 1.31 -1.16 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.25 -1.16 
Other food 0.05 0.10 0.18 -0.31 -0.31 -0.30 0.20 -0.07 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.30 -0.07 
Cotton lint, yarn -0.04 -0.06 1.87 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 2.40 0.69 0.53 0.47 0.45 0.30 0.69 
Textiles -0.04 -0.07 1.28 -0.45 -0.45 -0.46 1.72 0.60 0.44 0.34 0.32 0.07 0.60 
Leather -0.06 -0.09 1.88 -0.48 -0.48 -0.49 2.50 0.87 0.60 0.45 0.40 0.27 0.87 
Wood products -0.12 -0.12 0.45 -0.50 -0.50 -0.51 0.62 -0.47 0.19 0.18 0.14 -0.21 -0.47 
Chemicals -0.10 -0.11 0.63 -0.42 -0.42 -0.51 0.76 0.49 0.14 0.08 -0.20 -0.31 0.49 
Cement, bricks 0.49 0.49 1.21 0.09 0.09 0.09 1.36 1.06 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.00 1.06 
Petroleum refining -0.10 -0.10 1.00 -0.44 -0.44 -0.50 1.31 0.00 0.31 0.31 0.19 0.08 0.00 
Other manufacturing -0.01 -0.02 1.07 -0.40 -0.40 -0.41 1.44 0.42 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.42 
Energy 0.09 0.09 0.38 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 0.45 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Construction 0.00 0.00 0.23 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39 0.53 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.00 
Industry 0.38 0.48 -0.30 -0.06 -0.06 0.09 -0.39 0.36 -0.08 -0.19 -0.07 0.23 0.36 
Commerce 0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.39 0.22 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.19 0.22 
Transport 0.01 0.01 0.36 -0.38 -0.38 -0.38 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.17 
Housing 0.40 0.40 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Private services 0.09 0.09 0.40 -0.31 -0.31 -0.30 -0.39 -5.41 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.31 -5.41 
Public services -0.06 -0.06 0.10 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.00 
Services 0.05 0.06 0.26 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.39 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.29 0.17 
Overall 0.19 0.21 -0.11 0.27 -0.21 -0.18 -0.39 0.31 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
pl = output price; pl = local price; pva = value added price; pc = consumer price; pq = composite price; pd 
= domestic price; pm = import price; 
pe = export price; x = output; d = domestic demand; q = composite commodity; m = imports; and e = 
exports 
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Annexure Table 8—Detailed sectoral effects of elimination of production tax, % 
  Changes in Price Changes in Volume 
  px pl pva pc pq pd pm pe x d q m e 
Wheat irrigated 0.18 -18.93 0.32 -0.02 -17.29 -18.89 0.04 58.89 -4.07 -4.05 -3.80 -1.51 -4.87 
Wheat non-irrigated 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08    -3.78 -3.78 -3.78    
Paddy IRRI 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.09    0.15 0.15 0.15    
Paddy basmati 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.11    0.31 0.31 0.31    
Cotton 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.09    0.45 0.45 0.45    
Sugarcane 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11    0.22 0.22 0.22    
Other major crops 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.00 -0.25 -0.47 -0.50 -0.55 -1.53 0.67 
Fruits & vegetables 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.00 -0.32 0.71 0.69 0.62 -0.10 1.41 
Livestock, cattle, dairy 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.00 -1.33 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 0.66 -2.12 
Poultry 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.00 -5.66 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 0.00 -5.66 
Forestry 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.14 -0.01 -0.39 0.25 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.49 
Agriculture 0.11 -1.44 0.14 0.09 -1.42 -1.44 0.00 0.30 -0.28 -0.22 -0.08 -0.28 -0.32 
Fishing Industry 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.04 0.13 0.15 0.16 25.00 0.06 
Mining 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 0.06 0.10 0.26 0.29 -0.17 
Vegetable oil 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.02 -13.04 0.38 0.38 0.27 -0.07 -13.04 
Wheat milling 0.06 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.26 0.03 -5.32 -5.10 -4.62 6.83 -15.60 
Rice milling IRRI 0.03 0.06 -0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.15 -0.09 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.43 
Rice milling Basmati 0.06 0.08 -0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.08 -0.19 0.40 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.56 
Sugar 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11 -2.30 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.25 -1.16 
Other food 0.02 0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.10 -0.07 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.30 -0.07 
Cotton lint, yarn 0.01 0.01 -0.14 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.22 -0.12 0.53 0.47 0.45 0.30 0.69 
Textiles 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.08 -0.13 0.44 0.34 0.32 0.07 0.60 
Leather 0.04 0.07 -0.38 0.06 0.06 0.07 -0.55 -0.30 0.60 0.45 0.40 0.27 0.87 
Wood products 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -1.41 0.19 0.18 0.14 -0.21 -0.47 
Chemicals 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.08 -0.14 0.14 0.08 -0.20 -0.31 0.49 
Cement, bricks 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.10 2.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.00 1.06 
Petroleum refining 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.31 0.19 0.08 0.00 
Other manufacturing 0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.10 -0.10 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.42 
Energy 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Construction 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.00 
Industry 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.12 -0.08 -0.19 -0.07 0.23 0.36 
Commerce 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 -0.01 0.22 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.19 0.22 
Transport 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.17 
Housing 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Private services 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.01 -6.67 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.31 -5.41 
Public services 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.00 
Services 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 -0.01 -0.07 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.29 0.17 
Overall 0.07 -0.26 0.09 0.06 -0.23 -0.26 0.00 0.20 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
pl = output price; pl = local price; pva = value added price; pc = consumer price; pq = composite price; pd 
= domestic price; pm = import price 
pe = export price; x = output; d = domestic demand; q = composite commodity; m = imports; and e = 
exports 
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Annexure 9—Structure of CGE model of Pakistan 
  
 The basic structure of the model is discussed in Section 6. This appendix 
discusses modifications to the basic structure to adequately address the issues in the 
paper. In particular, the agriculture module is modified to allow the use of land and water 
in production. The model is specified in a mixed-complementarity problem (MCP) 
framework. 
Modifications 
 Agricultural Production: The basic model as described above uses equality 
constraints. However, this may be inadequate if applied to issues pertaining to 
agriculture. For example, land and water inputs may not be as substitutable as capital and 
labor in a well-behaved production function. Often, they are used in fixed proportions. In 
a numbers of instances, land and water may not be paid according to their marginal 
product contributions, or may not even be paid at all. Highly seasonal agriculture 
production results in the underutilization of land and water during certain periods of a 
given year. Thus, inequality constraints are more appropriate in modeling agriculture 
(Hazell and Norton, 1986).  
 Annexure Figure 1 shows how the agricultural module of the model is re-
specified. Similar to the basic model, output is a liner combination of value added and 
intermediate inputs using a set of fixed coefficients. However, this time added value is a 
CD combination of three factor inputs: aggregate capital, an aggregate labor input, and an 
aggregate land and water input. Capital is fixed, while labor is specified as a nested CD 
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function of ten labor types. Following Robinson and Gehlar (1996) and Cororaton (2004) 
the aggregate land and water input is specified as a nested linear combination of land and 
water.  
Furthermore, following Lofgren and Robinson (1997), the agriculture module is 
formulated as MCP. Basically, a model based on MCP contains a system of simultaneous 
equations (linear or nonlinear), which are a mixture of strict equalities and inequalities. 
The system works in such a way that each of the inequalities is linked with a bounded 
variable in a complementary-slackness relationship (Rutherford, 1995). The basic idea is 
similar to the Kuhn-Tucker necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. 
The agriculture production sector module in the revised model is specified as 
MCP. The details are presented in Annexure Table 8a. Equation 1 is the value added 
(VA) CD function of three factor inputs: an aggregate labor (L), aggregate capital (K), 
and aggregate of land and water (LW). The scale parameter of the function is κ, while the 
share parameters are α, β, and γ. Equation 2 is the first-order condition for profit 
maximization using production function in 1, which is also the demand for aggregate 
labor where (pva) is price of value added, and (w) the average wage. Aggregate labor is a 
nested CD function of various labor types, thus Equation 3 is the first order condition in 
the nested aggregate labor function and the demand for each labor type, where αn are 
parameters and wn the respective wage rates.  
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Annexure Figure 1—Agriculture production module 
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 Equations 4 to 11 are a set of relationships that capture the complementary 
slackness conditions for optimization involving land and water. In particular, the 
conditions involve the relationship between the overall rent for the use of land and water 
(rlw), and their demand and supply situation. Equation 4 is the first-order condition in the 
value added function for (LW), which is also the demand for the composite factor. 
Equations 5 and 6 are demand functions for land (LN) and water (WA), respectively, 
which are linearly related to (LW) using fixed coefficients (ϕ ). 
Equation 7 is the average rent for the use of (LW). It is the weighted average of 
the rent for land use and the rent for water use. However, both the rents for land use and 
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water use have two components: (rln + rln_p) for land use and (rwa + rwa_p) for water 
use. The variables with suffix _p will be zero if land and/or water constraints in 
Equations 8 and 9 are not binding. When the constraints are binding, however, the overall 
rent for land use is (rln + rln_p) and for water use (rwa + rwa_p). The economic 
interpretation for this is that when the constraint is binding, the shadow price for the use 
of the resource is higher. Thus, if in agriculture the supply of water is binding, the overall 
cost of production is higher. If the water supply is increased (e.g. improvements in 
irrigation are carried out), this relaxes the constraints and reduces the cost of production. 
Equations 10 and 11 are market equilibrium conditions for land and water. 
 Equation 12 is the zero-profit condition, which is required in competitive 
equilibrium models. Equation 13 is the market equilibrium for labor. Equation 14 alows 
the government give consumption subsidy, (spc), or impose a consumption tax, (tc). In 
the simulation exercise concerning consumption subsidy on wheat, spc was assigned a 
positive value while tc was set to zero. 
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Annexure 9a—Agriculture Production Module  
(1)  - -  VA L K LWα β γκ= ×                                 : value added 
(2)  ( / )L  pva w VAα= × ×                                  : demand for labor aggregate  
(3)  ( / )n n nL   w w Lα= × ×                                    : demand for Ln labor, where n has 10 labor types 
(4)   ( / )LW pva rlw VAγ= × ×                         : demand for composite land & water 
(5) ln  LN LWϕ= ×                                             : demand for land 
(6)   waWA LWϕ= ×                                            : demand for water 
 (7) 
( ) ( )ln   ln_     _  r r p LN rwa rwa p WArlw
LW
+ × + + ×⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
    : return to land &water  
(8) ln_  i
i
LNS r p LN× ≥∑                                : land constraint 
(9)  _  i
i
WAS rwa p WA× ≥∑                             : water constraint 
(10)  i
i
LNS LN≥∑                                               : land market 
(11)  i
i
WAS WA≥∑                                               : water market 
(12) ( ) ( )– – _ – ln ln_ lnr K Pva va w L rwa rwa p wa r r p× = × × + × + × : zero-profit condition 
(13) ( )n n i
i
LS L=∑                                                 : market for labor for n type 
(14) ( )  1   –  Pc Pq tc spc= ⋅ +                    : user price after subsidy/consumption tax 
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Annexure 9b—Complete Model Specification 
Core Equations Description 
i i ix vaυ= ⋅   Output 
i i iinp xη= ⋅   Intermediate input 
, ,j i j i iid a inp= ⋅  Matrix of intermediate input 
i i i
i i i i iva l k lw
α β γτ= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅   
Value added 
i i i il w va pva α⋅ = ⋅ ⋅   Aggregate labor 
n n
i n i il w l w α⋅ = ⋅ ⋅  Labor type n, where n=1…10 
i i i ilw rlw va pva γ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅   Composite land & 
water 
  ldi i ild lwϕ= ⋅   Land 
  wai i iwa lwϕ= ⋅   Water 
( ) ( ) + _ _i i irlw lw rld rld p ld rwa rwa p wa⋅ = ⋅ + + ⋅  Return to composite land & water 
_  iilds rld p ld⋅ ≥ ∑   Land constraint 
_  iiwas rwa p wa⋅ ≥ ∑   Water constraint 
_ _ (1/ _ )( (1 ) )i i ie e ei i i i i ix e d
κ κ κμ θ θ= ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅  CET: output (exports & 
domestic demand) 
_
1e
ie
i i
i i
i i
ped
pl
τθ
θ
⎡ ⎤−= ⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
 
Exports 
_ _ ( 1/ _ )( (1 ) )i i im m mi i i i i ix m d
ρ ρ ρξ δ δ− − −= ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅   
Armington (except for 
wheat) 
_
1 i
m
i i
i i
i i
pdm d
pm
σδ
δ
⎡ ⎤−= ⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
 
Imports 
h h hct dyh savh= −  Total consumption of each household 
, ,i h i i h hch pc ctω⋅ = ⋅  Commodity demand of each household 
i i iinv pc tinvψ⋅ = ⋅  Investment demand 
,i i jj
ind id=∑  Intermediate demand 
 n n niiyl w l= ⋅∑  Type n labor income 
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 ( _ ) iiyld rld rld p ld= + ⋅∑  Land income 
 ( _ ) iiywa rwa rwa p wa= + ⋅∑   
Water income 
 i iiyk r k= ⋅∑   
Capital income 
, ( )
n
h n h h h h h h hn
yh yl yld ywa yk div trgov yfor erη π ε= Ω ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +Φ ⋅ + + ⋅∑   
Household income 
 (1 )h h hdyh yh dtxr= ⋅ −   
Disposable income 
 (1 )f fyf yk dtxrε= ⋅ ⋅ −   
Firm income 
 i i iitmrev tm m er pwm= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅∑   
Tariff revenue 
 (1 )i i i i i i ii iitxrev itxr d pl itxr m pwm er tm= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +∑ ∑   
Indirect tax revenue 
 h h f fhdtxrev dtxr yh yk dtxrε= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅∑   
Direct tax revenue 
( )i i i iisubcd tc spc q pq= − ⋅ ⋅∑  Consumption tax/subsidy 
_yg tmrev itxrev dtxrev grant for er subcd= + + + ⋅ +  Government revenue 
h h hsavh dyhσ= ⋅   
Household savings 
_savf yf div div for= − −   
Firm savings 
_ ( ) _i i hi hsavg yg g c pc trgov paygv for= − ⋅ − −∑ ∑   
Government savings 
(1 ) (1 )i i i ipm pwm er tm itxr= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ +   
Import price 
i ipe pwe er= ⋅   
Export price 
i i i i i ipq q pd d pm m⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅   
Composite price 
i i i i i ipx x pl d pe e⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅   
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Export price 
(1 )i i ipd pl itxr= ⋅ +   
Domestic price 
( )i i i i ipc pq tc spc d= ⋅ − ⋅  Consumer price (for 
wheat spci >0) 
,i i i i j i jj
pva va px x id pc⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅∑   
Price of value added 
( ) ( )i pva + _ _i i i i i ir k va w l rld rld p ld rwa rwa p wa⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − + ⋅   
Return to capital 
, _i i h i i ihq ch inv ind g c leon= + + + +∑  Product market  
equilibrium 
hh
tinv savh savf savg cab= + + +∑   
Savings-Investment 
_ _
_
i ii
i i hi h
cab pwm m er div for paygv for
pwe e er yfor grant for er
= ⋅ ⋅ + +
− ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅
∑
∑ ∑  
 
 
Current account 
 iils l=∑  Aggregate labor equilibrium 
 n niils l=∑  Equilibrium in n type labor 
 iilds ld=∑   
Equilibrium in land 
 iiwas wa=∑   
Equilibrium in water 
Index:  i, j: sectors;     h: household groups;     n: labor types 
Note: All Greek letters are parameters 
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Endogenous variables: 
 
xi          output 
vai        value added 
idi,j     matrix of intermediate inputs 
inpi   intermediate inputs 
li  aggregate labor 
lwi  composite land & water 
lni  labor type n             
lni  land 
wai  water 
di  domestic demand 
ei  exports 
mi  imports 
qi  composite good 
cth  total consumption of each household group 
invi  investment demand 
indi  intermediate demand 
g_ci  government consumption 
tinv  total investment 
pci  consumer price 
subcd  government subsidy/consumption tax revenue 
yln  labor income of type n 
yd  land income 
ywa  water income 
yk  capital income 
yhh  household income 
dyhh  disposable income 
dtxrev  direct income tax revenue 
itxrev  indirect tax revenue 
tmrev  tariff rate revenue 
yg  government income 
savhh  household savings 
savf  firm savings 
savg  government savings 
w  average wage rate 
wn  wage rate of labor type n 
rlw  return to composite land & water 
rwa  return to water 
rld  return to land 
rld_p  premium return to land if constraint is binding 
rwa_p  premium return to water if constraint is binding 
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pli  local price 
pmi  import price 
pei  export price 
pqi  composite price 
pxi  output price 
pdi  domestic price 
pvai  price of value added 
ri  return to capital 
leon  walras law variable 
 
Exogenous variables: 
 
ls  supply of aggregate labor 
lsn  supply of labor type n 
lds  supply of land 
was  supply of water 
ki  capital stock 
div  dividend paid to local investors 
div_for dividend paid to foreign investors 
trgovh  government transfers to household 
y_forh  foreign income of households 
paygv_for government payments to rest of the world 
grant_for rest of the world grant to government 
pwmi  world import price 
pwei  world export price 
er  exchange rate 
cab  current account balance 
gt  total government consumption 
dtxrh  direct income tax rate for household 
dtxrf  direct income tax rate for firms 
itxri  indirect tax rate 
tmi  tariff rate 
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Annexure 10—Welfare Measurement 
 
 This appendix discusses how we measured the change in welfare of policy 
experiments. The discussion is based on Robichaud, (2001). 
 Let ( )Cμ  be the utility function, ( , )P Yν  the indirect utility function, and 
( , )m P Y  the money metric indirect utility function. C represents the vector of 
consumption of goods, P the vector of prices, and Y household income. The utility 
function in a Cobb-Douglas (CD) form is 
 
  ( ) iCD iiC C
αμ =∏ ,       where     1iiα =∑  
 
 The demand functions are derived function by maximizing utility subject to the 
budget constraint, i.e., 
  ( , )CD ii
i
YC P Y
P
α=  
 The indirect utility function is obtained by replacing Ci with the derived demand 
functions, i.e., 
  ( , )
i
CD i
i
i
YP Y
P
ααν ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∏  
 Solving Y from the indirect utility function yields the money metric indirect 
utility function, i.e., 
  ( , )
i
CD i
i
i
Pm P
α
ν να
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∏  
 Our measure of welfare is equivalent variation (EV), which is given as 
 
  0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0( , ( , )) ( , ( , )) ( , ( , ))i i i i i iEV m P P Y m P P Y m P P Y Yν ν ν= − = −  
 
 98
 For the CD specification EV can be derived as 
 
  0 1 1 0( , ( , ))CD CDi iEV m P P Y Yν= −  
          
0
1 1 0( , )
i
CDi
ii
i
P P Y Y
α
να
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∏  
          
0 1
0
1
i i
i i
i i
i i
P Y Y
P
α αα
α
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∏ ∏       
          
0
1 0
1
i
i
i
i
P Y Y
P
α⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∏  
 
 
 
 
 
